Đề tài A Vietnamese-English cross-cultural study of the use of hedging before giving bad news

PART 1: INTRODUCTION 1. Rationale It goes without saying that language plays an important part not only in recording and understanding culture but also in communication among people who share or do not share the same nationality, social or ethnic origin, gender, age, occupation. What is more, “language is closely related to the way we think and to the way we behave and influence the behavior of others” (Karmic 1998:79). Hence, culture can be well-understood or grasped with the help of language and culture exchanges (i.e. cross-cultural or intercultural communication). To support this point of view, Durant (1997: 332) claims that “to have a culture means to have communication and to have communication means to have access to a language.” Although well aware of the ultimate objective of learning a foreign language toward successful communication, many Vietnamese learners of English hold that a good command of a foreign language or success in foreign language learning lies only in mastering grammar rules and accumulating as much vocabulary as possible. As a result, even possibly producing grammatically well-formed utterances, they may experience unwanted culture shock, and communication breakdown when running into a real and particular context of situation. This unexpected incidence occurs due to their insufficient knowledge and awareness of social norms and values, roles and relationships between individuals, especially those from the target culture. It is worth noting that different languages and cultures have different expressions of behavior and different realizations of speech acts by language users. This has suggested a considerable number of researchers, both local and foreign to conduct their studies on cross-cultural pragmatics and/ or communication such as thanking, requesting, complementing, etc. However, little attention has been paid to the speech act of giving bad news using hedges. In daily life, no one likes to give their relatives or friends bad news because rarely does he/ she find it easy to reduce listeners’ feeling of sadness, to lessen the hurt, but sometimes even the best, brightest and most talented, the informers are left with no choice. Nevertheless, to convey bad news such as informing the death of the husband in an accident to his wife if the speaker goes straight to the point with: “Your husband died in the accident.” he/ she may cause such a sudden shock to the wife (the hearer) that she can hardly stand it. Conversely, the wife in the above case will feel less painful if the news is given this way: “As you know, among 212 passengers, only two survived. And I regret to inform you that your husband is not among the lucky two” Needless to say, hedges such as “as you know”, “I regret to inform” have been resorted to for the effect of minimizing the shock. Hedging is used in a certain context for specific communicative intent such as: one strategy of politeness, vagueness, and mitigation. Therefore, a desire to have a further insight into major similarities and differences in using hedges before giving bad news by native speakers of VNSs and ENSs has inspired the writer to develop her research entitled “A Vietnamese-English cross-cultural study of the use of hedging before giving bad news” . It is hoped that this study can provide the increase of some socio-cultural knowledge and awareness needed for better cross-cultural communication and foreign language learning and teaching in Vietnam. The significance of the study is two-fold: First, giving bad news is one of highly sensitive acts since this type of acts happens in everyday social interaction, and is obviously face threatening. Second, how to employ hedges/ hedging appropriately in order not to hurt the other in the act of giving bad news is essential to achieve successful communication. As there is a culture gap between Vietnamese and English, inappropriate language use may cause misinterpretation, miscommunication and communication breakdown among cross-cultural communicators. 2. Scope of the study - Although natural communication always comes with paralinguistic (speed, tone, loudness, pitch...) and extra-linguistic factors (facial expressions, eye contact, postures, orientation, proximity, movement, clothing, artifacts...), the study is confined to the verbal aspects of the act of giving bad news with the use of politeness and hedging. In addition, adjacency pairs are beyond the scope of this paper. - The study strictly pertains to the perspective of pragmatics though the author realizes that syntactic theory and semantics apparently do explain the meaning of the spoken word. - The Northern Vietnamese dialect and the English spoken by Anglophone community of England, America, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, are chosen for contrastive analysis. - The data are collected by conducting survey questionnaires to examine the ways VNSs and ENSs use hedges in conveying bad news. 3. Aims of the study - To find out the similarities and differences in the way VNSs and ENSs give bad news using hedges as a politeness strategy. 4. Research questions .What are the major similarities and differences in the ways VNSs and ENSs use hedges in conveying bad news? 5. Methodology - Quantitative method in the form of survey questionnaires is much resorted to. To collect data for analysis, both Metapragmatic Questionnaire (MPQ) and Discourse Completion Task (DCT) are designed. The collected data will be analyzed in comparing and contrasting techniques to find out the similarities and differences in the ways VNSs and ENSs perform the act of giving bad news using hedges as a politeness strategy. - The questionnaires were delivered to English-speaking people mostly living in Vietnam (working for Apollo, Language Links, British council) and some abroad (mostly in Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong). Based on English-speaking informants’ status parameters, the researcher looked for the Vietnamese subjects of similar parameters in order to have a symmetrical distribution of informants and data for the study. - Besides, discussion with the supervisor, colleagues, personal observations, recording from mass media and data collection from newspapers and magazines are also significant to the study. 6. Design of the study The study is composed of three parts. They are: Part 1 (Introduction) presents the rationale, scope, aims, research questions, and methodology of the study Part 2 (Development) consists of three chapters: Chapter 1 (Theoretical lead-in): discusses the notions of language-culture relationship, speech act theory, directness-indirectness, face, politeness, and politeness strategies. Chapter 2 (Hedging before giving bad news): explores different conceptualizations of hedging and gives hedging strategies, based on speech act and politeness theories Chapter 3 (Data analysis and findings) analyses collected data to find out major cross-cultural similarities and differences in the choice of hedging strategies in given situations Part 3 (Conclusion): summarizes the main findings of the study, provides some implications for TEFL, and offers suggestions for further research. PART 2: DEVELOPMENT CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL LEAD-IN When two or more strangers from different cultures communicate or exchange their information and attitude, they are doing intercultural or cross-cultural communication, trying to show or let the other(s) learn about their cultural values, norms, and beliefs. Since intercultural communication and cross-cultural communication are not very much different and are used interchangeably (Scollon in Hinkel 1999: 183), we therefore would like to adopt the view of intercultural communication as the exchange of information between individuals who are unalike culturally (Rogers and Steinfatt, 1999: 103). What is more, such communication is much influenced by different factors, notably the binary system of competence-performance (what one knows vs. what one does) and context (which sets the scene and shapes the meaning that will attributed to what is said). Cross-cultural or intercultural communication is simply defined as “the exchange of information between individuals who are unalike culturally” (Roger and Steifatt 1999: 103) or “whenever a message producer is a member of one culture and a message receiver is a member of another” (Porter and Samovar, 1985: 39). In cross-cultural communication, people from different cultures may not understand each other or get in trouble if they bring their cultural values and norms into mutual exchanges. One of the typical examples of cultural misunderstanding is that they transfer what is accepted in their culture to new situation of communicating with others from a different culture. This leads to not only serious misunderstanding, but also communication breakdowns or fatal consequences. For instance, people from the Anglophone cultures feel normal when saying “thank you” when offered a compliment on the work. Nevertheless, it is not the common way for many VNSs to do the same job. Therefore, when contacting each other, a Vietnamese and his Anglophone counterpart may have unexpectedly negative comments on each other about the same act. According to Thomas (1995) and Cutting (2003) one of the reasons for communication failure is that interlocutors may not have a good acquisition of the common language used in cross-cultural communication. All the above disruption can be said to be culture shock, which can lead to the feelings of estrangement, confusion, anger, hostility, indecision, frustration, etc. That is why one is advised to know how far one can go as individuals and learn about the culture one is exposed to. 1.1. Speech Acts “The inference the hearer makes and takes himself to be intended to make is based not just on what the speaker says but also mutual contextual beliefs.” (Bach, 1979: 5) Naturally, sociolinguistics confirms that the study of language has to go beyond the sentences that are the principle focuses of descriptive and linguistics. It must bring in social context. It must deal with the real contexts that make up human communication and social situations in which they are used. From this viewpoint, Austin discovers that: “The business of a statement can only be to describe some state of affairs or to state some fact, which must do either falsely or truly” (Cf Nguyen Hoa, 2000: 69) Some sentences, as he realizes, are not intended to do as such, but rather, are to evince emotion or to prescribe conduct, or to influence it in special ways. In uttering the sentence, the S is often performing some non-linguistic act such as: daring, promising, resigning, requesting, and warning and so on. Hence, the theory of speech act originated in Austin’s observation (1962) in which it is said that sentences are used to report states of affairs and utterance of some sentences can be treated as performance of an act. Richards defines speech acts as an utterance or a functional unit in communication. Similarly, Hymes (1972) defines them as the acts we perform when we speak. When we say “Hello” or “How are you” that is, we have just performed an act of greeting, “Please open the window” – an act of requesting and so forth. It is argued that speech acts are culture-specific and the manner of performing them is governed by social norms which differ from one speech community to another. Indeed, Hudson believes that the concepts used in classifying speech acts are typical of cultural concepts. Following is how illocutionary acts are classified: Austin Searle Bach and Harnish Exposives Assertives/ Representatives Assertives Commisives Commisives Commisives Behabities Expressives Acknowledgement Exercitives Directives Directives Verdictives Declaratives Verdictives Effectives 1.2. Directness and indirectness 1.2.1. Directness and indirectness “I love you. Please marry me!” (A direct way) “I’ll buy a house but I would be very lonely when living there without you” (an indirect way to ask a special person to marry) – Sunflower, 1997 Similarly, in many Vietnamese folk poems, indirect ways of love declaration are found abundant. For example: “Bây giờ mận mới hỏi đào Vườn hồng có lối ai vào hay chưa?” In daily life, the utterance is not always unambiguous and clear. Not only direct but also indirect ways are resorted to for verbal expressions. Thus, directness and indirectness are the two basic forms of expression that are linguistically and culturally universal. It is impossible to say that one language uses only straightforward or direct ways of expression while the other employs just roundabout or indirect expressions. The ways of language is employed to depend largely on what is termed “culture thought patterns” that appear, to various degrees, different in different cultures. In the study of 700 essays of international students in the United States, Kaplan (1972: 31) proposes four discourse structures (otherwise referred to as “cultural thought patterns”) that contrast with English linearity (figure a). He mainly concentrates on writing and restricts his study to paragraphs. Parallel constructions, with the first idea completed in the second part (figure b) Circularly, with the topic looked at from different tangents (figure c) Freedom to digress and to introduce “extraneous” material (figure d) With different lengths and parenthetical amplifications of subordinate elements (figure e) They are respectively illustrated by the following diagrams: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Kaplan’s diagrams Each diagram represents a certain language or a group of languages. He identifies his discourse types with genetic language types, respectively: Figure a with English Figure b with Semitic Figure c with Oriental Figure d with Romance Figure e with Russian According to the diagrams, English people often use roundabout and direct patterns whole the Oriental people in general and the Vietnamese in particular seem to prefer roundabout and indirect patterns. In the Anglophone main stream culture, the ideal form of communication includes being direct rather than indirect. Many expressions exemplify this tendency such as Don’t beat about the bush! Let’s get down to business; Get to the point! etc. All indicate the importance of dealing directly with issues rather than avoiding them. Let’s look at the following example: Host: Would you like some more dessert? Guest: No, thanks. It’s delicious but I really had enough. Host: Ok, why don’t we leave the table and sit in the living room? The host does not repeat the offer because he is sure that the guest really means what he says. In such a situation, if the guest is still hungry, he will directly say Yes, I’d like some more. Thank you. In the same situation, the Vietnamese, when invited, to take some more tend to refuse to be socially accepted as “polite” and expect that the offer will be extended the second or third time before he accepts it. For example: Host: Chẳng mấy khi bác đến chơi nhà, mời bác ở lại dùng bữa với chúng em (You rarely come to visit us, we invite you to stay and have dinner with us) Guest: Ôi thôi, cảm ơn cô chú. Tôi chỉ ghé qua thăm cô chú và gia đình thôi. (Oh, no, thank you. I only pay a short visit to you and your family) Host: Bác cứ nói thế, chả mấy khi …….. (You say so, rarely …..) Guest: Phiền cô chú quá, cứ mỗi lần đến chơi cô chú lại bày vẽ …… (I trouble you, whenever I visit you; you go to unnecessary lengths to …..) Finally, the guest agrees to stay and have dinner with the host Directness and indirectness in English and Vietnamese can also be found in what Nguyen Quang call “by-the-way phenomenon”. For such “safe” topics as good news, congratulations, weather. This phenomenon happens less frequently. But for the “subtle” and “unsafe” topics (bad news, borrowing money, sex, religions, etc) this phenomenon appears much more frequently. It has been found that, in English, the purpose of interaction seems to be made overt at the beginning, but in Vietnamese, things seem to go the other way round. In many cases, if someone puts the purpose of his talk upfront, he may be considered rude. According to Nguyen Quang (1998), if time permits and relationship allows, interactants will have small talk or discussion of unrelated issues. He proposes the following diagrams first: Small talk By the way Purpose Small talk By the way Purpose (Vietnamese) (American English) 1.2.2. Factors affecting directness and indirectness There are many socio-cultural factors affecting the degrees of directness and indirectness in communication. Nguyen Quang (1998: 5) proposes twelve factors that, in his argument, may affect the choice of directness and indirectness in communication. Age: the old tend to be more indirect than the young Sex: the female prefer indirect expression Residence: the rural population tend to use more indirectness than the urban one Mood: While angry, people tend to use more indirectness Occupation: Those who do social sciences tend to be more indirect than those who do natural sciences Personality: The extroverted tend to use more directness than the introverted Topics: While referring to a subtle topic, a taboo …., people are more inclined to indirectness Place: When at home, people tend to use more directness than when they stay elsewhere. Communication environment/ setting: When in an informal climate, people tend to express themselves in a more direct way. Social distance: Those who are closer tend to talk in a more direct way. Time pressure: When in a hurry, people are likely to use more directness Relative powers: When in a superior position, people tend to be more direct to their inferiors. (English version by Ngo Huu Hoang, 1998:14) 1.3. Face, politeness, and politeness strategies “Politeness is basic to the production of social order and a precondition of human cooperation, so that any theory which provides an understanding of this phenomenon at the same time goes to the foundation of human social life.” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 54) 1.3.1. What face? Face is a technical term used in psychology and sociology to refer to the status and esteem of individuals within social interactions (Thompson 2003: 32). Since face, understood as every individual’s feelings of self-image (Thomas 1995: 169), can be damaged, maintained or enhanced through interaction with others, a person often claims for him/ herself through interaction. That is why in everyday interchange, we usually avoid embarrassing the other person, or making him feel uncomfortable simply because we bear in mind that everybody has basic face needs or wants which refers to the respect that individual has for him or herself. According to Brown and Levinson (1987: 61-62), face is “the public self image that all rational adult members of society possess” and “something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained or enhanced and must be constantly attended to in interaction with others. Once face is damaged or threatened, there seems to be a risk of communication breakdown. Therefore, maintaining or partially satisfying each other’s face seems to be the major and apparently the only motivation to be polite in communication (Watts 2003, Holmes 1995). To many scholars, face consists of two opposing face wants: Positive and negative face. 1.3.1.1. Positive face Normally, people are typically caught between the wants to achieve their own goals and the desire to avoid infringing their partners’ face (both positive and negative face). Positive face, as Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) observe, is “the positive consistent self-image or personality (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants”. In other words, positive face is seen as the desire that others like, admire, value, or approve of one’s wants (material or non-material) or the need to be accepted and liked by others, treated as a member of the group, and to know one’s wants are shared by others. 1.3.1.2. Negative face Negative face, according to Brown and Levinson is “the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction, i.e. to freedom of action and freedom of imposition”. In other words, “negative face is reflected in the desire not to be impeded or put upon, to have the freedom to act as one chooses” (Thomas 1995: 169), or “the wants that one’s action be unimpeded by others” (Eelen 2001: 3), and “the need to be independent, to have freedom of action, and not to be imposed on by others” (Yule 1996: 61) 1.3.1.3. Face threatening acts (FTAs) According to Brown and Levinson (1987), certain illocutionary acts are liable to damage or threaten another person’s face; such acts are known as “face threatening acts” (FTAs) by, for instance, representing a threat to or damaging the H’s positive face (insulting the addressee or expressing disapproval of what the H holds valuable or does something) or his/ her negative face (impinging upon H’s freedom of action in the case when H likes gossiping). They define FTAs as “those acts that by their nature run contrary to the face wants of the addressee and/ or of the speaker” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 65). Along the line, Yule (1996) observes that an FTA occurs when a speaker says something that represents a threat to another individual’s expectation regarding self-image. 1.3.2. What politeness? 1.3.2.1. Politeness defined Politeness has received various amounts of attention and controversy from all areas of linguistics, especially sociolinguistics and pragmatics, throughout the 20th century. There have been so far two main approaches to politeness: politeness as social norms (normative politeness) or conversational principle and maxims or do’s and don’ts (Lakoff 1973, 1989; Leech 1983) and face-saving acts or politeness strategies (strategic politeness) (Brown and Levinson 1978, 1987) (Cf Nguyen Duc Dan 1998, Nguyen Quang 2003). In her cross-cultural study on politeness, Blum-Kulka (1987: 131) suggests that politeness is “(i) a function of redressive action with the latter having correlative relationship with indirectness, (ii) an interaction achieved between two needs, the need for pragmatic clarity and the need to avoid coerciveness and (iii) a social distance and role relationship”. By giving such a definition, Blum-Kulka implies the tendency that the more indirect we go, the more polite we become. More correctly, she places politeness on the same par with negative politeness by challenging the claim that there is a direct relationship between indirectness and politeness. Intuitively speaking, it seems workable as seen in Anglophone cultures. However, it is, too, intuitively untenable because it does not necessarily means that going direct is less polite, hence “indirectness does not necessarily/ always imply politeness” (Blum-Kulka 1987: 131). For example: (1) Indirect: Nhà cửa gì mà trông như chuồng lợn thế này. (Implied to tidy up the room) Direct: Dọn dẹp phòng đi con. (Tidy up the room, son) (2) Indirect: What’s the wife expected to do at this time? (Meaning “to prepare dinner”) Direct : Time to cook, honey. Despite the fact that all utterances are FTAs to various degree, the direct ones seem more comfortably accepted, thus more polite. However, this confirms the idea proposed by Dascal (1983, cf. Thomas 1995: 120) that indirectness is costly and risky in that an indirect utterance takes longer for the speaker to produce and longer for the H to process (costly) and the H may not understand what the speaker is getting at (risk). Nguyen Quang (1994: 23) provides a satisfactory definition of politeness (which is adopted as a working definition of politeness for this study), not “leaning” to any side of the coin, and with no bias against either positive or negative politeness, but reconciliation of the two extremes. He confirms that “politeness is any communication act (either verbal or non-verbal, or both) that is intentionally and appropriately meant to make another person/ other people feel better or less bad”. Setting aside the non-verbal aspect as mentioned in the scope of the study, the thesis author in convinced that this definition covers both ends of the continuum of positive and negative politeness by implying that politeness involves taking into account the feelings of others (Holmes, 1992: 296, Wardhaugh 1986: 280) and it is the means employed to show awareness of another person’s face (Yule 1996: 60), used to show concern for people’s face (Brown and Levinson 1987). In this study, the adopted model of politeness, or “polite way of talking” which is seen as deviations from Grice maxims (for politeness reasons) is that of Brown and Levinson’s due to the following reasons: First, putting aside the views of conversational principle and maxims, and conversational contract, the distinction between normative and strategic politeness is rather loose and relative in that almost all illocutionary acts should operate within the framework of interpersonal relationships. Second, it is the author’s opinion that normative politeness based on social norms is the departure or foundation of strategic politeness. What require normative politeness to be realized are interpersonal relationships where interlocutors should follow some certain politeness norms to save or preserve the other’s face. This, in turn, will more or less make a twist and impetus to implement strategies. Third, in interpersonal verbal interaction, no matter whether a dispraise is constructive or not, every dispraising utterance carries in itself potential damage or threat to the addressee’s positive and negative face. Fourth, politeness strategies, both positive and negative, when used, can (i) support and enhance the addressee’s positive face (positive politeness) and (ii) help avoid transgressing the addressee’s freedom of action and freedom from imposition (negative face). Finally, Brown and Levinson’s model is adequate for the interpretation of ongoing verbal interaction in which participants are reciprocally attending to one another’s face needs (Watts 2003: 101) 1.3.2.2. Politeness principles This is certainly true that all of the approaches to politeness (Lakoff’s, Leech’s, and Brown & Levinson’s) are appropriacy-based or conflict-avoidance-based, where politeness is a matter of using the right words in the right contexts as determined by conventional rules of appropriateness. Lakoff (1973) argues that the majority of conversation is governed by what is termed the politeness principle. Similar to Grice (but earlier), she claimed that there are three maxims or rules that speakers should follow in conversation to maintain politeness: Don’t impose – This is similar to the theory of negative politeness – trying not to impose on people or to disrupt them in any way. It can be seen through such expressions as: I’m sorry to bother you ….. Could you possibly ……? I know it’s asking a lot …… Give options – It is avoiding forcing the other participant into a corner with the use of such expressions as: It’s up to you …… I won’t be offended if you don’t want to …. I don’t mind if you don’t want to ……. Make the hearer feel good – We say things that flatter the other participant and make him/ her feel good; rather in the same way we pander to positive face. This can be seen through the use of such expressions as: What would I have done without you? I’d really appreciate your advice on this I owe you one for this Leech’s (1983) Politeness principle (PP) consists of 6 maxims (Tact, Generosity, Approbation, Modesty, Agreement and Sympathy), which are related to the notion of cost and benefit and much related to offering favorableness to the hearer. Leech sees PP as being of the same status as Grice’s Cooperative Principle (CP), which it “rescues” by explaining why speakers do not always observe the Gricean maxims (Thomas 1995: 159). Leech (1983) includes politeness as interpersonal rhetoric that involves three different sets of conversational maxims, namely those pertaining to Grice’s cooperative principle, the principle of politeness akin to that of Lakoff, and the “irony” principle. In his theory, politeness may be realized by weighing one’s linguistic behavior against a group of maxims whereby speakers can minimize hearer’s cost and maximize hearer’s benefit (tact maxim), minimize their own benefit and maximize that of the hearer (generosity maxim), minimize hearer dispraise and maximize hearer praise (approbation maxim), minimize self-praise and maximize self-dispraise (modesty maxim), minimize disagreement and maximize agreement between oneself and others (agreement maxim) and minimize sympathy between oneself and others (sympathy maxim). Brown and Levinson (1987) do not set a rule of politeness principles as Lakoff and Leech did, but drop a hint by providing the following schema, termed “possible strategies for doing FTAs”, available to speakers to encounter unavoidable face-threatening acts, to make appropriate communicative choices and to reduce the possibility of damage and threat to hearer’s face or to the speaker’s own face. Once a decision has been made, they argue, the speaker selects the appropriate linguistic means to accomplish the chosen strategy. Their schema proposes five components of communicative choices: (1) without redressive action badly, (2) positive politeness, (3) negative politeness, (4) off record and (5) don’t do the FTA (or refrain from doing the FTA). Each strategy on the schema is numbered 1-5, the general principle being that the higher the number the more polite the strategy. 1. Without redressive action, badly On record 2. Positive politeness Do the FTA With redressive action 4.Off record 3. Negative politeness 5. Don’t do the FTA Possible strategies for doing FTAs (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 69) Based on this model, Brown and Levinson have identified a whole series of linguistic strategies available to speakers to enable them, if they so wish, to minimize threat to face. If a speaker chooses to commit an FTA, they can go “on record”, say “badly, without redress”: - Smarten yourself up The second way available to go “on record” is to choose to pay attention to face through redressive action. Thus, they may redress the FTA by choosing positive politeness that attends to positive face, to enable S to pay attention to H’s positive face by the use of in-group identify markers such as: - You’re so good at solving computer problems. I wonder if you could just help me with a little formatting problem I’ve got. Or they can redress the threat with negative politeness that respects the hearer’s negative face (when FTAs are unavoidable) which includes the marking of deference through using the V pronoun, or, for example, the elimination of all reference to both S and H through the use of impersonal pronouns, inclusive pronoun they or we. It is said that ….. (impersonalization) People said that …(impersonalization) Alternatively, they can’t go “off-record” and drop a hint to the hearer: - It’s a laundry day, I see. Finally, they can choose not to do any FTAs, seen as the least face-threatening acts (just to be safe). To conclude, in doing an FTA, the speaker needs to balance three wants: The want to communicate content of the FTA The want to be efficient (or urgent) The want to maintain H’s face to any degree 1.3.2.3. Positive politeness and strategies As regards the sociological factors/ variables of P, D and R that bring about significant influences on positive polite linguistic choices, positive politeness is defined as forms for free-ranging, solidarity-oriented emphasizing shared attitudes and values, minimizing social distance, “maximizing the politeness of polite illocutions” (Leech 1983: 84) and “essentially other-oriented behavior” (Holmes 1995: 26) According to Brown and Levinson (1987: 101-103), “positive politeness is redress directed to the addressee’s positive face, his perennial desire that he wants …should be thought of as desirable”. However, they emphasize “it is not necessarily redressive of the particular face want infringed by the FTA because positive techniques are used as a kind of metaphorical extension of intimacy, implying common ground or sharing of wants, social accelerator to indicate that he (the hearer) wants to ‘come closer’ to H”. For example: to an acquaintance (about 5 years younger than you) Take a chill pill, man! All of the above ideas of positive politeness are summarized in Nguyen Quang’s definition which reads: “Positive politeness is any communicative act which is intentionally and appropriately meant to show the speaker’s concern to the hearer/ addressee, thus, enhancing the sense of solidarity between them. Simply put, positive politeness is to show the speaker’s concern to others. In this case, positive politeness can be called warm or proximal, intimate politeness”. (Lecture note on cross-cultural communication, CFL-VNU, 2003: 43) The kernel thrust of the definition Nguyen Quang contributes to the intracultural and cross-cultural communication is that he implicitly suggests that positive politeness strategies are appropriate between those who know each other well, or those who wish to know each other well, and being polite in the contexts of P, D and R’s operation involves how to express a range of speech functions in a culturally appropriate way. When interacting or getting socialized with other people, what we normally do is to pay attention to satisfying face needs. When face is threatened in interaction, both aspects of face come under fire (Mey 1993) or under risk of “losing face”, which motivates the speaker to adopt linguistically appropriate choices to ‘save face’. In the case of the undesirable state of threatened face engendered by an FTA, politeness strategies are developed to satisfy the dual aspects of face or any aspect of an FTA, and then there appear positive and negative politeness strategies when the speaker goes on-record with redressive action. Therefore, it is worthy of note that politeness strategies are relevant realizations of redressive action for the speaker’s choice to go on-record. Brown and Levinson (1987) give multifarious examples to illustrate the kinds of choices to open to the speaker and posit fifteen sub strategies of politeness addressed to the hearer’s positive face. According to them, positive politeness strategies aim to save positive face, or are addressed to H’s positive face and described as expressions of solidarity, intimacy, informality, and familiarity. Thus, they are developed to satisfy the positive face of the hearer chiefly in two ways: (i) by indicating similarities amongst interactants (using in-group markers such as let’s in English or chúng ta/ chúng mình in Vietnamese), and (ii) by expressing an appreciation of the interculator’s self-image. The following fifteen strategies are addressed to positive face, and are thus examples of positive politeness (cited from Watts 2003 and Nguyen Quang 2003). (1) Strategy 1: Notice, attend to H (her/ his interests, wants, needs, goods etc) - Ái chà chà! Hôm nay nhân dịp gì mà diện bộ củ đẹp thế. À này, có tiền cho tớ vay năm chục. (Wow, how smart you look today! What occasion? By the way, can I borrow 50,000 VND, if you have?) (2) Strategy 2: Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H) - Good old Jim. Just the man I wanted to see. I knew I’d find you here. Could you spare me a couple of minutes? - Giời ơi, chặc …. chặc….., chặc …. con bé ấy vô cùng quyến rũ. (3) Strategy 3: Intensify interests to the hearer in the speaker’s contribution - You’ll never guess what Fred told me last night. This is right up your street. - Cậu biết không, bọn tớ quyết định tháng sau sẽ cưới. (4) Strategy 4: Use in-group identity markers in speech - Here’s my old mate, Fred. How are you doing today, mate? Could you give us a hand to get this car to start? - Ta đi chứ anh bạn (Shall we go, mate?) (5) Strategy 5: Seek agreement in safe topics - I agree, right. Manchester United played badly last night, didn’t they? D’you reckon you could give me cigarette? - Mình chuyển sang làm cho UNICEF rồi. - Cho UNICEF cơ à? Nhất đấy! (6) Strategy 6: Avoid disagreement - Well in a way, I suppose you’re sort of right. But look at it like this. Why don’t you? - Anh nói cũng có lý nhưng theo tôi không thể đốt cháy giai đoạn được. (7) Strategy 7: Presuppose, raise, and assert common ground - People like you and me, Bill, don’t like being put around like that, do we? Why don’t we go and complain? - Túi nặng quá em ạ. - Em biết lắm chứ. Toàn bộ giầy dép của em ở trong ấy mà lị. (8) Strategy 8: Joke to put the hearer at ease - A: Great summer we’re having. It’s only rained five times a week on average - B: Yeah, terrible, isn’t it? - A: Could I ask you for a favor? - Các bố ấy không phải là Mike Tyson và vợ các bố ấy không phải là những bịch cát (9) Strategy 9: Assert and presuppose knowledge of and concern for hearer’s wants - I know you like marshmallows, so I’ve bought you home a whole box of them. I wonder if I could ask you for a favor. - Tớ biết cậu không khoái ba cái trò tiệc tùng bù khú nhưng vì hôm nay có cả sếp của tớ dự nên cậu đến tiếp hộ tớ nhé. (10) Strategy 10: Offer, promise - I’ll take you out to dinner on Saturday if you cook the dinner this evening. - Này, hôm nào ra Hải Xồm lai rai đi. (11) Strategy 11: be optimistic that the hearer wants what the speaker wants, i.e. that the FTA is slight - I know you are always glad to get a tip or two on gardening, Fred, so if I were you, I wouldn’t cut your lawn back so short. - Trông mời mọc quá nhỉ. Tớ phải thử một miếng để xem tài nấu nướng của cậu tiến bộ đến đâu rồi. (12) Strategy 12: Include both S and H in the activity - I’m feeling really hungry. Let’s stop for a bite. - Tại sao ta không đi biển nhỉ? (13) Strategy 13: Give and ask for reasons - I think you’ve had a bit too much to drink, Jim. Why not stay at our place this evening? (14) Strategy 14: Assert reciprocal exchange or tit for tat - Dad, if you help me with my math homework, I’ll mow the lawn after school tomorrow. - Tớ thổi cơm, cậu dọn bàn nhé. (15) Strategy 15: Give gift to H (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation) - A: Have a glass of malt whisky, Dick. - B: Terrific, thanks! - A: Not at all. I wonder if I could confide for a minute or two. In addition, Nguyen Quang (2003: 91-99) proposes two more strategies (16) Strategy 16: Console, encourage H - Việc gì phải buồn, thua keo này ta bày keo khác. - It’s nothing, really. Don’t give up. You have my backing. (17) Strategy 17: Ask personal questions - Thu nhập có khá không? - Anh chị sinh được mấy cháu rồi? 1.3.2.4. Negative politeness and strategies Whereas positive politeness is free ranging, negative politeness is specific and focused; it performs the function of minimizing the particular imposition that the FTA unavoidably effects (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 129) or it is “minimizing the impoliteness of impolite illocutions” (Leech 1983: 84). Socio-linguistically, negative politeness involves expressing oneself appropriately in terms of social distance and respecting status differences (Holmes, 1992: 297). Recognizing that “negative politeness is redressive action addressed to the addressee’s negative face: his want to have his freedom of action unhindered and his action unimpeded” (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 129), Thomas (1995: 172) makes it clear by stating that “negative politeness is oriented towards a hearer’s negative face, which appeals to the hearer’s desire not to be impeded or put upon, to be left free to act as they choose”. To observe and cover both pragmatic and socio-linguistic aspects of intra-culturally and cross-culturally communicative environment, Nguyen Quang (2003: 44) proposes his own definition of negative politeness: “Negative politeness is any kind of communicative act which is appropriately intended to show that the speaker does not want to impinge on the addressee’s privacy, thus, enhancing the sense of distance between them. Simply put, negative politeness is not to poke your nose into others’ privacy. Negative politeness can be called distancing/ cool/ distant politeness” Briefly, negative politeness strategies, in Brown and Levinson’s (1987) words, conversely are addressed to H’s negative face and are characterized as expressions of restraint, formality, and distancing. They are furthermore viewed as more face redressive, i.e. more polite, than positive strategies, a point which was discussed earlier. Thus, they can be also expressed in two ways: (i) by saving the interlocutor’s face by mitigating FTAs; or (ii) by satisfying negative face by showing respect for the addressee’s right not to be imposed on. Following are the ten strategies addressed to the hearer’s negative face (cited from Watts 2003 and Nguyen Quang 2003) (1) Strategy 1: Be conventionally indirect - Could you tell me the time please? - Anh có thể lấy hộ tôi quyển sách ở trên bàn kia được không? (2) Strategy 2: Do not assume willingness to comply. Question, hedge - I wonder whether I could just sort of ask you a little question. - Nói chí ít ra anh ta cũng kiểu như hơi chậm hiểu. (3) Strategy 3: Be pessimistic about ability or willingness to comply. Use subjunctive - If you had a little time to spare for me this afternoon, I’d like to talk about my paper. - Nên chăng ta đứng ngoài cuộc thì hơn. (4) Strategy 4: Minimize the opposition - Could I talk to you for just a minute? - Tôi chỉ muốn hỏi anh là tôi có thể mượn ô tô của anh về quê ngày mai được không? (5) Strategy 5: Give deference - Excuse me, officer. I think I might have parked in the wrong place. - Tôi ngu quá đi mất. Nhẽ ra tôi phải hỏi ý kiến anh trước mới phải. (6) Strategy 6: Apologize - Sorry to bother you but …….. - Xin lỗi phải ngắt lời anh nhưng đấy không phải là ý tôi muốn nói. (7) Strategy 7: Impersonalize the speaker and the hearer. Avoid the pronouns I and you - A: That car is parked in a no-parking area. - B: It’s mine, officer - A: Well, it’ll have to have a parking ticket. - Có lẽ vấn đề không đơn giản như vậy đâu. (8) Strategy 8: State the FTA as an instance of a general rule - Parking on the double yellow is illegal, so I’m going to have to give you a fine. - Đề nghị hành khách xuất trình hộ chiếu và vé máy bay khi làm thủ tục vào sân bay. (9) Strategy 9: Nominalize to distance the actor and add formality - Participation in an illegal demonstration is punishable by law. Could I have your name and address, madam? - Mong ước của tôi là hàng tháng kiếm đủ tiền để nuôi các cháu ăn học đầy đủ. (10) Strategy 10: Go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting H - If you could just sort out a problem I’ve got with my formatting, I’ll buy you a beer at lunchtime. - Việc này trong tầm tay tôi. Anh khỏi phải lo. Nguyen Quang (2003) suggests one more strategy (11) Avoid asking personal questions - How much do you earn a month? (avoided) - Why don’t you marry at such an age? (avoided) - Chị làm ở đấy lương có cao không? (avoided) - Anh bao nhiêu tuổi rồi? (avoided) However, it is worth pointing out that there are some overlaps, or overlapping cases in which it is hard to identify what kind of politeness an utterance belongs to. For example, Stop whining (Ngừng ca cẩm đi) Im ngay đi (Shut up) It is firstly, a directive which is a non-redressive on-record act, thus not seen as a polite utterance. However, if it is added with some redressive factor, such as the politeness marker please, kinship terms etc. It can become less face-threatening: Stop whining, please. (English) Làm ơn im ngay đi. (Vietnamese) The above view can be found in Thomas (1995), Eelen (2003), Watts (2003) and others when they claim that there exist some cases in Brown and Levinson’s model which is hard to demarcate even what positive politeness and negative politeness are. All the theories discussed above are the basic way leading to hedging/ hedges displayed in chapter 2 CHAPTER 2: HEDGING BEFORE GIVING BAD NEWS 2.1. Hedging defined The word “hedge” or “hedging” can be broadly defined as referring to a barrier, limit, defense or the act or means of protection (see The Oxford English Dictionary vs. hedge and hedging). The designation “hedge/ hedging” itself was introduced first by G.Lakoff (1972) in his article: “Hedges: A study in meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts”. In his synchronic, non-contrastive study of the oral and written standard English, Lakoff defines hedges (from the point of view of language philosophy) as words whose function is to make meaning fuzzier (e.g. sort of) or less fuzzy. Lakoff argues that the logic of hedges requires serious semantic analysis for all predicates. Lakoff defines hedges as follows: “For me, some of the most interesting questions bare raised by the study of words whose meaning implicitly involves fuzziness-words whose job is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy. I will refer to such words as “hedges”’. However, with the fast development of linguistics, hedging phenomena, seen as a purely semantic phenomenon, have been attacked from the perspective of pragmatics, thus said to contribute to the interpersonal function of language, by which we are able to “recognize the speech function, the type of offer, command, statement, or question, the attitudes and judgments embodied in it, and the rhetorical features that constitute it as a symbolic act” (Halliday and Hassan 1989:45, cf. Vartalla 2001) Although the terms “hedge” and “hedging” have been part of linguistic vocabulary for some thirty years now, no unified description of the concepts is to be found in literature. As Hylland (1998) states “straightforward definitions of the notions are rather rare and the existing characterizations soon reveal that the terms are used in different ways by author”. Despite attempts to bring order into multitude of definition, it appears that researchers continue to approach the concepts of hedge and hedging in a variety of ways. Differences are also to be found in terminology relating to the area, terms other than hedge and hedging being employed to describe some of the linguistic phenomena elsewhere described as hedges. Notions like stance markers (Atkinson 1999), compromisers (James 1983), understatements (Hubler 1983), downtowners (Quirk et al 1985), downgraders (House and Kasper 1981), softeners (Crystal & Davy 1975), backgrounding terms (Low 1996), approximators and shields (Prince et al 1982) and pragmatic devices (Stubbe&Holmes 1995) appear in literature where the term hedge might be used by other scholars. Similarly, phenomena that certain studies call hedging have in other studies also been treated under headings such as: evidentiality (Chafe 1986), mitigation (Labov & Fanshel 1977), indirectness (Tannen 1982, Lakoff 1990, Hinkel 1997), tentativeness (Holmes 1983), and vagueness (Chanell 1994). Holmes (1975:73-5) asserts that devices which reduce the force of an utterance are generally labeled “hedges” and these hedging devices attenuate or reduce the strength of the utterance or soften/ weaken the effect of the utterance. They damp down its force or intensity or directness. By giving the notion of boosters seen as devices utilized to increase the illocutionary force of any utterance in which they are used, she deliberately inclines towards the idea that hedges are for positive politeness. Brown and Levinson (1987:145) define “hedge” as “ a particle, word or phrase that modifies the degree of membership of a predicate or a noun phrase in a set, it says of that membership that it is partial or true only in certain respects or that it is more true and complete than perhaps might be expected”. This definition reveals a fact that hedges are “strengtheners” as well as “weakeners”. Hedges are sometimes extended to the area of gambits. They are conversational gambits which play an important part in conversations as the various social, psychological, and communicative signals. In Richards’s definition (50:118) “Gambits may be used to show whether the speaker’s contribution adds new in formation, develops something said by previous speaker, expresses an opinion, agreement, etc” Referring the so-called quán ngữ, a possible equivalent to gambit in his work “Từ và nhận diện từ trong tiếng Việt”, Nguyễn Thiện Giáp argues: “Gambits are repeatedly-used expression in discourses for coherence, cohesion, communication, emphasis on ideas” (English version by Ngo Huu Hoang, 2003:7) (Quán ngữ là những cụm từ cố định lặp đi lặp lại trong các văn bản để liên kết, đưa đẩy, rào đón hoặc nhấn mạnh nội dung cần diễn đạt nào đó) (1976:176) Most of the Vietnamese linguists agree that Vietnamese gambits belong to the “set expression” category in Vietnamese. In conclusion, hedging is considered to be a strategy used to hedge the propositional content (the propositional accuracy-Nguyen Quang 2003) and illocutionary force of the utterance. Along the line, the thesis author would add that (i) hedges are expressions which do not add any false or truth values to the content of an utterance, (ii) hedges are attitude markers that can be taken as an indication of speakers’ sensitivity towards the hearer. To have deeper insight into hedges, different linguistic theories should be studied in detail. 2.2. From the point of view of semantics In his article “Fuzzy Set-Theoretic Interpretation of Linguistic hedges”, Zadeh (1972) follows Lakoff in using the new destination hedge and analyzes English hedges (such as simple ones like: very, much, more or less, essentially or slightly and more complex ones like technically and practically) from the point of view of semantics and logic. It is assumed that: “Hedges are operators that act on the fuzzy set representing the meaning of their operands. Hedges vary in their dependency on context”. Lakoff’s semantic characterization of hedging portrays hedges as words that may be realized as two seemingly contradictory functions, namely those of making things fuzzier or less fuzzy. In fact, it appears that hedges have been considered by most scholars as devices with the primary function of making things semantically fuzzier. However, by approaching the status of hedges in how we conceptualize the universe, it is to illustrate that at the semantic level hedging may indeed be seen to have both of these dimensions that is to make things fuzzier and less fuzzy. Hedging as an increase in fuzziness Hedging is firstly often linked to purposive vagueness and tentativeness, which suggests that hedges are typically associated with an increase in linguistic fuzziness. This view can be traced back to Lakoff’s work which emphasizes that natural language sentences are not often entirely true, false nor nonsensical, but rather somewhat true and somewhat false. Brown and Levinson (1987: 145) explicate Lakoff’s work and say that hedges may be regarded as elements that can “modify the degree of membership of a predicate or noun phrase in a set”. In this capacity, hedges can also be used to take place of the truth value of referential information somewhere on the continuum between absolute truth and falsehood. Hedging as a decrease in fuzziness However, many studies have disregarded Lakoff’s view of hedging as an increase in fuzziness. Hence, hedges may alternately be looked upon as devices that in fact decrease fuzziness. Hedges could indeed be interpreted to signal that the phenomenon under scrutiny does not conform to the limited conceptual categories of natural language, and by way of distancing the phenomenon from the core of a given conceptual category hedges actually render the relationship between the phenomenon of the universe and the relevant conceptual categories more accurate. The two semantic characterizations of hedging offered above both stems from the element of fuzziness inherent in hedging device, it probably often being impossible to distinguish between the interpretations in practice. Nevertheless, being aware of these possible interpretations is useful when we turn to the way in which hedging occurs in different communication situations. 2.3. From the point of view of pragmatics Hedging has more recently been approached as pragmatic rather than a purely semantic phenomenon. In much of the more recent work relating to hedging, it is the interpersonal aspect of the strategy that has been given emphasis, hedging has been analyzed with an eye on the communication situation, particularly the effect of the strategy on the relationship between sender and addressee in face-to-face communication. Generally speaking, the more pragmatics-oriented descriptions of hedging phenomena presented in literature are often rather circumspect notions for the purposes of a particular research project rather than thorough deliberations of the phenomenon. Addressing hedging, it can be defined plainly as “the process whereby the author reduces the strength of what he is writing”. Markkanen and Schroder (1985) define hedging as a strategy of “saying less than one means”, the function of strategy being to modify the writer’s responsibility for the truthfulness of an utterance, to modify the attitude of the author to the propositions and information put forth in a text or even to hide this attitude. Another author, in turn, see hedges as items that “signal features of hedging, avoidance of sender responsibility toward the referential information presented evidently being the primary motivation of hedging in these depictions”. 2.4. Hedging as both positive and negative politeness Much of previous work on hedging is based on Brown and Levinson’s treatment of hedges (1978/ 1987) where it is reasoned that hedges can be used to avoid “assuming or presuming that anything involved in the FTA is desired or delivered by H”. This is meant that hedging can be used to indicate that S does not want to impose upon H’s desires or beliefs. Brown and Levinson thus discuss hedges as a greater length as one of ten strategies linked to negative face protection. Hubler (1983: 156-159) picks up the idea of hedging phenomena as indications of negative politeness and contends that hedges are primarily used in negative face work, hedging devices being “detensifying” elements which sender can employ “to maximize the emotional acceptability of the propositional content presented to the H for ratification”. On the other hand, hedges can also be interpreted as simultaneously serving the sender’s negative face. 2.4.1. Hedging as a negative politeness strategy Hedges/ hedging in general belong to negative politeness. Brown and Levinson (1987: 105) appoint that: “In a literature, “hedge” is a particle, word, or phrase that modifies the degree of membership of a predicate or noun phrase in a set” For example, English Vietnamese A serving is a sort of toy Kiểu như một trò chơi John is a true friend John đúng là một người bạn tốt I rather think it is hopeless Tôi thoáng nghĩ là không có hi vọng đâu You are quite right Hình như bạn hơi đúng According to Brown/ Levinson (1987), conversational principles are the sources of strong background assumptions about cooperation, in formativeness, truthfulness, relevance, and clarity which on many occasions need to be softened for reasons of face. Here to, hedges are the most immediate tool for the job and the authors discuss such hedges on Grice’s Maxims. The four maxims of Grice recognized are quality, quantity, relation, and manner. - The quality states: +Make yourself as informative as required (for the current purpose of exchange) +Don’t make us contribution more informative than it is required -The quantity maxim says: +Don’t say what you believe to be false and +Don’t say that for which you lack adequate evidence -The relevance maxim says: +be relevant -Grice’s specific maxims of manner are: +Be perspicacious +Avoid obscurity of expression +Avoid ambiguity Grice’s idea becomes the basis for what Fraser (1990) calls a conversational maxim view of politeness from the conversational viewpoint found in the work of R.Lakoff’s paper (1973) and Leech’s (1978). Lakoff (1990) wishes to show that in addition to semantic and syntactic rules, language users follow rules of pragmatic competence for reasons of politeness. Then Brown and Levinson (1987) distinguishes four different kinds of hedges, namely those affecting illocutionary force, hedges on Grice’s maxims, hedges addressed directly to politeness strategies and hedges encoded in prosodic and kinetic strategy. However, due to limited time, the author only takes notice of hedges on Grice’s maxims. *Hedges addressed to Grice’s maxims _ Quality hedges (i) Quality hedges may suggest that S does not taking full responsibility for the truth of his utterance English Vietnamese There is some evidence to the effect that…. As far as I know ………………………….. I may be mistaken but I think…………… I’m not sure if it’s right but ……………… I guess …………………………………… I believe …………………………………. I assume …………………………………. Có một số dẫn chứng cho thấy là…….. Tôi không chắc lắm ………………….. Theo chỗ tôi biết …………………….. Tôi nghĩ rằng ………………………… Tôi cho là ……………………………. Nghe đâu là …………………………. Tôi tin là …………………………….. E.g. Don’t be so sad. I believe he is still alive. Em không ngờ anh hoàn toàn ngược lại so với suy nghĩ của em. Có thể em sai nhưng em muốn biết cuộc hôn nhân vội vàng của anh có hạnh phúc không? (Báo Thế giới Phụ nữ số 39/ 2002) (ii) Or alternately they stress S’s commitment to the truth of his utterance English Vietnamese With completely honesty I can say ………. I absolutely deny that ……………………. I absolutely believe that …………………. Thú thực là ……………………… Tôi thực sự tin rằng …………….. Tôi hoàn toàn tin là ……………... (iii) Or they may disclaim the assumption that the point of S’s assertion is to inform H. English Vietnamese As you know …………………………….. As you probably/ may know ……………. As you and I both know Như các bạn đã biết………………. Mọi người biết đấy ………………. Có người nói rằng ……………….. Có người cho rằng ………………. Người ta cho rằng………………… E.g. “I am not sure and let me tell you why I am not sure. It seems to me ………I want to be as accurate as I can be. Seems to me the last time she was there to see Barry before Christmas we were joking (…..) and so I said would qualify or something like that. I don’t/ I don’t think we ever had more of a conversation than that about it”. (Bill Clinton – By Nguyen Hoa – An introduction to semantics, p.168) “Rồi như anh vẫn vừa nói đấy, bây giờ em đang băn khoăn ……. thì liệu rằng có quay lại với nhau đi chăng nữa, em có giữ gìn được tình yêu hay không? (An interview on VOV 12/ 2003) (iv) As quality hedges, we have degrees of probability expressed in increasing doubt. English Vietnamese Definitely Probably May/ might Có thể là E.g. He will probably coming He just may come Có thể là anh ấy sẽ không đến đâu. Anh cố gắng làm tốt đồ án và sống tốt ở Hà Nội nha anh. Rất có thể ngày anh bảo vệ đồ án tốt nghiệp em sẽ không ra cổ vũ anh được. Đừng giận em nha! (Báo Thế giới Phụ nữ số 27/ 2002) Em không thể nói, không thể diễn tả được mình đã đau đớn thế nào khi chúng mình chia tay nhau mặc dù chúng mình đã có nhiều kỷ niệm đẹp bên nhau. (v) These are also quality performed by auxiliary, emphasizing adverbs on explicit and deleted performatives English Vietnamese For sure I see it I can infer I widely conjecture Truthfully Honestly, Quite candidly, Quite frankly, Tôi chắc chắn đấy Thành thật mà nói Nói thật là Cũng phải nói ngay rằng E.g. The thief broke the lock, for sure I saw it I would say he won’t go out with Mary. _ Quantity hedges (i) Quantity hedges give notice that not as much or not as precise information as might be expected English Vietnamese I can’t tell you than that it is I should think Roughly More or less Approximately Give or take a few Or so All in all In nutshell To cut a long story short In short Basically So to speak Sort of Some sort of …. like To some extent In a way Somehow Up to a point Tôi cũng không biết chắc Tôi không còn biết nói gì hơn Khoảng chừng là Áng chừng là Xấp xỉ là Hình như là Tưởng như là, đâu như là Hàng chục là, hàng năm là Kiểu như là À, kiểu như nó cũng Ở một khía cạnh nào đó Về cơ bản là Biết đấy là đâu, biết đâu được chuyện đấy Một chút nữa, một tí nữa (ii) We also get expression with clear politeness functions like “I just say” - I just say getting there is not easy as it looks. - A: Have you ever been there? B: Well somewhere in the Middle East _ Relevance hedges (i) There are hedges English Vietnamese This may not be relevant/ appropriate/ timely but ……. This may sound like dumb question but…. Not to change the subject ……………….. Now is probably the time to say ………… I might mention at this point …………… Since I’ve been wondering ……………… Since it’s been on my mind …………….. Sorry, I’ve just thought ………………… By the way ……………………………... Oh I know ……………………………… Anyway ………………………………... While I remember ……………………... While I think of it ……………………... All right now Không biết có nên nói không Không dám cảm phiền ông Của đáng tội Chết một cái là Quả có thế ạ Nói bỏ ngoài ngoài tai Dù sao đi chăng nữa Tiện thể là Nhân tiện đây À nhân tiện Nói trộm bóng vía Nói anh bỏ quá cho (ii) The use of “now” interacts with the use of tense deixis, now making a claim for relevance (because it is a proximal deictic marker) and past tense hedging a bit on the relevance Now I was wondering if ……………. (iii) Also under this rubric fall hedges on whether the point or the purpose of the speech act is in fact relevance. For examples: - For assertions: I don’t know whether you’re interested but………………… If you ask me, ………………………… …………….., in case you want to know - For reply to the questions: Yes, since you ask Yes, if you care to know Vâng nếu anh thực sự muốn thế Vì anh đã hỏi nên Anh có biết không Nếu anh muốn biết, ý kiến của tôi là - For questions: …………..., do you know? - For commissives: I’m sorry, if you want to know my feelings. I’m furious, if you care to inquire my feelings on the matter. - For declarative : If you allowed me, …………………….. If we all agree …………………………. (iv) And there are clauses that modify the performative verb by giving reason why S made the utterance, making this an explicit claim to being relevant. E.g. Do you have any flour to spare because I’ve just run out? _ Manner hedges English Vietnamese If you see what I’m getting at If you see what I’m driving at To be succinct, Not to beat about the bush You see……………. What I meant was……….. More clearly, …………… To put it more simply, …. Now to be absolutely clear, I want I’m not sure if it makes sense …... I don’t know if this is clear at all Tôi xin đi thẳng vào vấn đề Ý tôi là…………………… Nói đơn giản là………….. Nói nôm na là …………... Để cho rõ ràng hơn …….. (ii) Not related are these expressions that query whether is following S’s discourse adequately English Vietnamese Yeah? Got it? OK? You with me? Is that clear? See? Phải không? ……….mà ……….nhé ……….nghe …… Rõ chưa? Such maxim hedges as those we have been discussing are used with great frequency in ordinary talk. According to Brown/ Levinson, they have in many cases straightforward politeness applications. Quality hedges that weaken S’s commitment may redress advice or criticisms: “I think perhaps you should”. Quantity hedges may be used to redress complaints or requests: “Could you make this copy more or less final?” Relevance hedges are useful ways of redressing offers or suggestions: “This may be misplaced but would you consider…?” And manner hedges can be used to redress all kinds of FTAs: “You are not exactly thrifty, if you see what you meant”. In addition to the hedges on the maxims with their FTA uses there are some which, while they may be derived from Maxim hedges, function directly as notices of violations of F wants. For example: “Frankly, to be honest, I hate to have to say this but ……, I don’t want to hurt you but (which preface criticisms and bad news)”. 2.4.2. Hedging as a positive politeness strategy In much of previous work, hedging has been viewed as a negative politeness strategy, but it may also at times be seen to have a positive politeness dimension. Brown and Levinson (1978/ 1987) are of the opinion that one way to express positive politeness toward one’s addressee; to communicate “that one’s own wants … are in some respects similar to the addressee’s wants” (1987: 101) is to avoid disagreement. One avoidance strategy is rending one’s opinion safely vague, seeking agreement with the addressee when the latter has not made his or her position clear. Sometimes, S may choose to be vague about his own opinions, so as not to get seen to disagree. For this reason, one characteristic device in positive politeness is to hedge these extremes in order to make one’s own opinion safely vague. Some hedges can have positive politeness functions as well, notably: sort of, kind of, like, in a way. E.g. I really sort of hope that your presentation will be good It is beautiful, in a way. True maybe. 2.5. Linguistic realizations of hedging The earliest studies into hedging were limited to a fairly narrow selection of linguistic expressions. For instance, only about 70 different items were listed in Lakoff’s paper. More recently, numerous linguistic phenomena have been associated with hedging; there nevertheless is no absolute uniformity between studies as to which linguistic phenomena should be regarded as falling within the category. Literature relating to hedging seems to suggest that hedges are linguistic choices that include an inherent component of fuzziness, providing the opportunity to comment on group membership, truth value and illocutionary force. However, there is variation between studies as to the actual items treated as hedges. In some studies, as in the case with Prince et al’s paper, the phenomena treated as hedges are not described very thoroughly. In other studies, the focus is on a specific linguistic feature, not the broad range of alternatives available for hedging. Hedges are sometimes listed as a number of items used for rounding numerical data, including items like: about, approximately, close to and in that round. While certain studies face with a specific linguistic phenomenon, others have attempted to cover a wider range. Studying hedging in new writing is drawn attention to an array of devices. How vagueness in presenting a list of other items typically used as hedges is firstly discussed. Most of the items on the list are verbal or adverbial expressions that involve different degrees of probability or otherwise play down the responsibility of the sender as concerns propositional content. The main categories consist of auxiliaries (e.g. may, might, can, could), semi-auxiliaries (appear, seem), full verb (suggest), the passive voice, various adverbs and adverbial (probably, almost, relatively), some adjectives (probable), indefinite nouns and pronouns. Similar items are also mentioned by Makannen and Schoder (1985) that modal verbs and particles, the use of some pronouns and even the avoidance of others, agentless passive, other impersonal expressions, and certain vocabulary choices may be seen as central manifestations of hedging in English and German. Skelton points out that there are a very large number of ways in which one can hedge in English, including impersonal phrases, the system of modal expressions, verbs like seem, look and appear, introductory phrase like I think, the suffix –ish in connection with certain adjectives and so on. While there are clearly numerous ways in which hedging may be realized in English, it is obvious that there are certain evident types of linguistic expression the spring to mind in this respect. As noted earlier, in the seminal work by Lakoff (1973), hedging was first approached with reference to a relatively limited set of hedges, including lexical items and phrases such as: roughly, sort of, strictly speaking, etc. In the course of time, the concept of hedging has come to be understood more broadly as including a numbers of ways of expressing uncertainty, vagueness, hesitation, and the like, that is, to cover various linguistic manifestations of feelings and thoughts. Here comes the overview of categories of hedges, all the details will be expressed later. First of all, the author would like to mention one of hedging devices-it’s modal auxiliaries, consisting of eight different modal auxiliaries, namely can, could, may, might, must, should, will, would. It may/ might/ can/ could well be true that he beat her. Full verbs are indeed used as hedges such as: believe, appear, assume, suggest, propose, imply, tend, imagine, reckon, seem. I don’t believe he knew me. In addition, we have adjectives used as hedges (potential, possible, likely, common, normal, usual, slight, and substantial); nouns as: likelihood, possibility, prospect, tendency, prediction, guess, hope, inclination” and adverbs: “usually, slightly, almost, generally, likely, apparently, potentially, somewhat, greatly, frequently, nearly, approximately”. I almost resigned. It can’t be denied that clause element also plays as hedges: If my memory doesn’t fail me As far as I know/ as you know I may be mistaken but I think I’m not sure if it’s right but I guess/ think …… Since I’ve been wondering ….. From linguistic realizations of hedging above, many researchers have basis to clarify hedges. Classification Prince/ Fader/ Bosk Within propositional content From the viewpoint of discourse analysis Prince et al start from Lakoff’s definition of hedges as devices that make things fuzzy, but add that there are at least two kinds of fuzziness. One is fuzziness within the proposition content, the other fuzziness “in the relationship between the prepositional content and the speaker that is speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition conveyed” (Prince/ Fader/ Bosk, 1982: 85). Hedges were mainly discovered in the discourse that was related to the physicians’ uncertainty in the medical-technical domain. approximators In the relationship between the propositional content and the speaker shields Fuzziness Accordingly, there are two types of hedges; one is called approximator affecting the truth-conditions of propositions. His feet were sort of blue. Approximator And shield, reflects the degree of the speaker’s commitment to the truth-value of the whole proposition, not affecting the truth-conditions. I think his feet were blue. Shield Hubler A similar distinction is distinguished by Hubler (1983) between what he calls understatements and hedges although both are devices used for expressing “indetermination”. For example, the following sentence is indeterminate. It’s a bit cold in here. However, according to Hubler, there are two kinds of indetermination: phrastic and neustic. understatements Phrastic indetermination concerns the propositional content of a sentence Neustic indetermination is connected with the claim to validity of the proposition a speaker makes Indetermination hedges Thus, this sentence contains an understatement It is a bit cold in here Understatement While the following consists of a hedge It is cold in Alaska, I suppose Hedge Hubler’s division thus greatly resembles what are called approximators and shields by Prince/ Fader/ Bosk. Hubler himself admits that both understatements and hedges perform the same function of expressing indetermination, of making sentences more acceptable to H and thus increasing their chances of ratification. 2.6. Hedging before giving bad news 2.6.1. Giving bad news as a speech act Types of illocutionary acts are distinguished by types of illocutionary intents (intended illocutionary effects). For example, to inform someone of something is not only to express a belief in it but also to express one’s intention that H believes it. According to the theory of speech acts of Austin, Richard, Yule…, like any other speech activities, giving bad news is produced as a speech act, namely, an act of announcing, disclosing, informing, reporting, advising performed via an utterance by participants in interaction. Giving bad news is an illocutionary act. Like most illocutionary acts, it is “in some sense the inherent function of the speech acts, which might be established, by simply looking at the act itself in relation to existing beliefs” (Hudson, 1990: 111). Much taxonomy of illocutionary acts has been proposed but we will not discuss or compare all of them. Austin’s original scheme (1962, lecture XII) included a rich variety of illocutionary act type but as Searl (1975) has argued that there are no clear principles by which Austin collected them into his five classes. All subsequent taxonomies are attempted improvements on Austin’s. Its category should satisfy the criteria for scheme’s blades of classification must be tied to some systematic account of illocutionary acts. Let us look at the following suggestions of some famous authors on the speech act classification in order to find out the position of the speech act of giving bad news in language use in context According to Austin, they are divided into four types: explosives, exercitives, behaveties and commisives. Similarly, Searl suggests five types, namely: _ Representatives: tell people how and what things are. A representative can be tested either true or false as the speaker asserts, says, reports, informs, suggests, doubts, denies and so on. _ Directives: get the H to do something by using suggestions, requests, commands, etc. _ Commissives: commit the S to do something such as promises, threats, etc. _ Declaratives: bring about changes in the world _ Expressives: express feelings and attitudes about a certain state of affairs, for instance, to apologize, regret, thank, etc. Bach and Harnish (1979: 41) also suggest the following four subdivisions of illocutionary acts, which are basically the same as the ones of Austin and Searl and the position of giving bad news can be easy seen as follows: Communicative illocutionary acts I II III IV Constatives Assertives Predictives Retrodictives Descriptives Informatives Confirmatives Concessives Retractives Assentives Dissentives Dispulatives Responsives Suggestives Supportives Directives Requestives Questions Requirements Prohibitives Permissives Advisories Commissives Promises Offers Acknowledgement Apologize Condole Congratulate Greet Thank Bid Accept Reject As can be seen in the table, giving bad news is recognized from the Constative column, which expresses the S’s belief and his intention or desire that the H has a form or continues to hold a like belief. Informatives simply consist of such items as: advise, announce, apprise, disclose, inform, insist, notify, point out, report, reveal, tell, testify. What distinguishes informative from simple assertives is that the speaker expresses (in addition to his belief) the intention that the H forms the belief that P. For assertives, S expressed intention is that H forms the belief, or continues to believe that P. We might say that the time of utterance, S presumes that H does not believe that P. Here we rely on a notion of illocutionary presumption in his illocutionary intention. 2.6.2. Hedging as a device As Brown and Levinson (1987) illustrate, hedging can also be used to tone down the force of for example request, as in “Give me a hand, if you can”. In such cases, one might even say that the reservation included in the hedge may be seen as a way out for the addressee in case he or she in fact is not in a position to help, the hedge thus signaling the conditions under which the request may be disregarded by the addressee. As work by Stubbs (1986) and Markkanen and Schroder (1982) illustrate, hedging may be taken to involve lexical items, propositions and illocutionary forces. While distinguishing between hedges of these three types is illuminating in theoretical terms, it seems that the distinction between them is not always clear-cut. G.Lakoff who drew attention to the theoretical importance of the phenomenon also reports R. Lakoff’s observation that certain verbs and syntactic construction convey hedged performative that is, they modify the force of speech act. They can also be studied as Hedges on illocutionary force. It is performative hedges in particular that are most important linguistic means of satisfying the S’s wants. Such hedges may be analyzed as adverbs on performative verbs that present the illocutionary force of the sentence. In the first place, operations are syntactically done in English with tags or with expressions like: “I wonder”. These markers are called “Appealers” by N.Quang It was cold, wasn’t it? Do me a favor, will you? I wonder if (you know whether)……. Sometimes performative hedges are encoded on words or particles which may also hedge propositional content. He really did run that way I tell you sincerely he ran that way I tell you he certainly ran that way These examples above illustrate that adverbs on higher performatives may be lowered into an embedded position in their complement sentences, hence the ambiguity as to what is being modified. Brown and Levinson (1987) divided particles which hedge illocutionary force into “strengthener” those that mainly act as emphatic hedges: “exactly”, “precisely”, “emphatically” and “weakeners” those that soften or tentativize what they modify. Nevertheless, the author only investigates weakeners mentioned above in the scope of the study because of the suitability to the topic of the thesis “Hedging before giving bad news”. Weakening particles is to use adverbs as: “really, sincerely, and just” Sincerely, the more I hear about your husband, the less I like him. That’s just true. The tentativizers: “perhaps, maybe, I wonder” which seem often to indicate the presence of an implicature are ways of avoiding FTAs. It looks good, but maybe, this job does not suit you. Có vẻ tốt lắm nhưng có lẽ công việc này không phù hợp với anh đâu. Dubitative particles: “I guess/ I think/ I suppose …..” suspend the felicity condition on assertions that the S knows what he says to be true: “You are sad, I guess”. As we can see above, the felicity condition dubitative particles suspend is the sincerity condition so that S is not claiming to be doing the speech act he appears to be doing or doesn’t take responsibility for the truth of his assertion. In the second place, Heringer (1972:55) describes a set of illocutionary force hedges that consist of the expression of a felicity condition in an “if clause” Catch me if you can “If you can” in the above example pragmatically functions as hedges on the force of the speech act. Here comes the other phrases of “if clause”. I wonder if/ I wonder whether …….. …………if I may ask you? …………if you don’t mind? …………if you want/ you can? If you allow me …………….. If you are already …………... Another level of phenomena is presented by “you know”, “you see”, “I mean”, “as it were”, “in all possibility”, “it seems to me”. I was coming out of the door, you know when I mean I saw him standing there, waiting. From the contrary-to-expectation sense one moves naturally to a commiservative usage which softens the FTA of conveying bad news and which we can gloss as: “I’m afraid”, “I’m sorry”. He’s left, I’m afraid. I’m sorry, he didn’t come. FTA source for implicatures are “sort of, kind of, a mere” and “a little bit, just a little bit” serves notice of reluctance impinge. I sort of hate to say this but …….. The fish is great, but a little bit salty. Món cá này rất ngon nhưng hơi mặn một chút (Vietnamese) Or indicate a co-operative avoidance of positive disagreement. I really sort of think. There are phrases which have distribution predicable essentially on pragmatic rather than semantic grounds but which are transparently related to literal meanings that already have hedging functions. In his reply to Ross (1970) and G. Lakoff, Fraser (1972) notes apparent counter examples to the claim that the performative verb must be the highest verb in surface structure. I regret that I must inform you of your dismissal. I am pleased to be able to offer you the job. I would like to congratulate you. Since on our view performativity is indirect even in explicit performative utterances, these sorts of sentence offer no special problems for our account. Embedding increases the inferential load on the H, but there is no difference in kind between performative utterances with embedded and those with embedded performative verbs. Sadok (1974: 55-61) has in effect argued against the indirectness of these cases and Fraser (1975) has gone on to investigate sentences like these in some detail under the label of hedged performatives. Fraser (1975) has discussed the interesting cases of utterances that differ from simple performative utterances in the performative verbs preceded by a modal like “must”, “can”, “will”, “would”, “might”, “should” or semi modal such as “have to”. Such utterances seem to have the illocutionary force of the act named by the performative verb used, as illustrated by typical utterances of sentences like these: I must ask you to leave I can promise you will be home. I want to thank you for the Beaujolais. I would suggest you try some. Fraser is concerned both to account for their illocutionary force in terms of certain conventional principles, and to account for cases (weak performative) that do not have the force of the act named by the performative verb, such as: “I must forbid you from cutting off your right arm”. Fraser seems to assume (he says nothing explicity) that simple performatives do not pose the same explanatory problem as hedged performatives. Since he indicates nothing to the contrary, presumably he thinks that simple performatives are literal and direct illocutionary acts and therefore that they have their illocutionary force. For hedged performatives, like standardized indirect acts generally, there is ample precedent for the inference the H is intended to make, consequently the SAS is short-circuited. What distinguishes direct performatives and hedged performatives from illocutionary standardization generally is that the illocutionary verb explicitly occurs in the utterance. Thus the H’s search procedure, even if such utterances lacked precedent, would be simple and short. In reviewing the other main cases of hedged performatives, we will give brief versions of the inference required in accordance with the maxim of sufficient reason. According to Fraser, hedged performatives with “can” generally require some adverbial like “now”, “finally” or “at last” to count as the sort of illocutionary act named by the performative verb. I can now admit that I did Such an adverbial is not necessary, however, as shown by example repeated here: I can promise you will be home. The hedged performatives with “would”, “might”, “should” are interesting because grammatically they seem to be consequence of subjunctive conditionals without any expressed antecedent. A sentence like this might be construed as an elliptical version of a conditional with an antecedent like “If you were to ask my opinion”. I would suggest a short of Irish whiskey. Finally, Fraser claims that for each kind of hedged performative only certain sorts of illocutionary verbs work performatively with the modal (or other expression) in question. The following, for example, are clearly not acts of the sort named by the performative verb. I must invite you to say. I can (now) ask you to go I will order you to sit down. However, it is not the verb itself but the verb together with its complement that determines whether an utterance of a sentence in normal circumstances has the illocutionary force designated by the verb. The following examples, with the same verbs as in these examples, seem to have that illocutionary force: I must invite you to another one of those horrible parties at the boss’s house. I can (now) ask you to turn up the radio-the kids are asleep finally. I will order you never to come back until I tell you to. In each case the hedged form has the illocutionary force named by the verb because the utterance meets the conditions that hedged performatives of that sort need. Hedged performatives with “must” are acts that the S is reluctant to do. Those with “can” imply that the conditions were not right previously vat is now. Those with “will” imply that the S was not previously willing or that a certain condition is assumed under which he is willing. And so on for other cases. The point is that performativity, simple or hedged, is not a question of semantics. The only question about the acceptability of a performative reading of sentences used performatively, that is, to perform an act (indirectly in our view) of the sort named by the performative verb. When such a sentence is so used on a given occasion, no special reading is required to explain that use. 2.6.3. Hedging strategies in giving bad news As mentioned earlier, hedging can be seen as a politeness strategy, in this part, the writer would like to discuss and then suggest some possible hedging strategies used to save S and H’s face in reducing the weightiness of face risks or face threats. The following classification of hedging derives from the perspective of pragmatics or politeness strategies. First, it is based on Hyland’s (1998) polypragmatic paradigm which is composed of speaker-oriented, hearer-oriented, and content-oriented. Second, it comes from House and Kasper’s (1981) typology of politely linguistic tools and Holmes’ notion of hedges realized in the light of polite language. Finally, it is essentially background by Brown and Levinson’s (1987) paradigm of politeness strategies. Strategy 1: Showing tentativeness and mitigation In this strategy, S assumes that what follows hedges can be wrong, i.e. S’s knowledge about who is given bad news, his information could be unilateral or one-sided. In the meantime, S also wants to show his lack if confidence what is said. That is why S should be as much tentative as possible in communicating the content to the H and the content must be open for H’s decision. Theo tôi biết nhiều thứ đánh mất không cách gì lấy lại được. Hình như cô ấy không còn yêu anh nữa rồi. (Lost has been lost and nothing as far as I can see has been gained. She seems not love you any more). I could pet her and spoil her that as I wanted to pet you. But she wasn’t like you. She loved me. It was blessing that I could take the love you did not want and give it to her….When she went, she took everything. (Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the wind: 1005). Observe my hand, my dear. I could tear you in pieces with them with no trouble what so over and I would do it if it would take Ashley out of your mind. But it wouldn’t… (Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the wind: 914) You are cracked about June. I can tell you one thing …. that she has the Buccaneer in tow, she doesn’t care two pence about you. (J.Galsworthy, The man of property: chapter 5) Không biết là anh có biết không em đã nói với bản thân mình là em sẽ quên anh và em sẽ rời xa anh mãi mãi. (Thế giới Phụ nữ, số 35/ 2003) Tôi kiểu như (sort of) cũng khó chịu lắm. Nhưng thôi, cái chuyện quá nhăng nhít của anh ấy cũng mặc anh ấy thôi, miễn là đừng bỏ vợ bỏ con để đi theo cái con ranh kiểu như (sort of) mắt xanh mỏ đỏ ấy là được rồi. Anh có biết rằng khi anh ra đi anh đã để lại cho em biết bao nỗi buồn không? Nay anh quay về với em nhưng lòng em đã khép rồi anh ạ. (Thế giới Phụ nữ, số 29/ 2003) Strategy 2: Self-abasing/ Self-blaming This strategy of self-abasement or self-blame inclines to the idea that using hedges in this strategy, the S wishes to show his modesty and humbleness in letting the H know about his intention. S in this case realizes that his utterance can be an annoyance to some extent. For example: Hỏi khí không phải, năng lực của anh đã đủ thầu dự án này chưa nhỉ? Em mang tội với anh nhiều lắm nhưng biết nói làm sao được em không thể không ra đi. (I may be mistaken but I cannot stay here) This may not be appropriate but I have to tell the truth: I’m not fond of you. Strategy 3: Talking up This strategy is closely related to strategy 2. The use of this strategy points out that S wants to deliberately and implicitly flatter H’s status in order to decrease threats to H, hence not to make H hurt when hearing the following negative comments from S. Nếu tớ mà là cậu, tớ sẽ không nhận làm công việc quá vất vả thế đâu. Xinh đẹp và hiểu biết như cậu thế này mà lại yêu anh chàng lêu lổng thất nghiệp đấy à? Strategy 4: Apologizing Possibly due to the fact that S is not sure about the accuracy of what he is saying, he must apologize before giving the bad news. In this case, S also shows that he is reluctant to do such a thing that he should not have done. I sort of hate to say this but I have to let you know your aunt is suffering from fatal disease. I’m sorry; all I know is this work doesn’t suit you. I don’t want to hurt you but I have to inform that your husband is forced to resign. I’m sorry; if you want to know my feelings, it is I don’t love you. Mình xin lỗi khi phải thông báo với cậu một tin là anh ấy sẽ không đến dự tiệc tối nay đâu. Anh ấy đã đi công tác xa rồi. Strategy 5: Offering/suggesting options Since giving bad news is highly face-threatening, S can use this strategy as a way out. In this case, S does not infringe on H’s freedom by proposing an option which he thinks could be possible for H to take. Có lẽ hai ta có duyên mà không có phận. Anh hãy quên em đi nhé. (Thế giới Phụ nữ 32/ 2003) You wouldn’t worry so much about him. We have more important things to do. I would like to advise you that you could do well to pass the exam. Strategy 6: Showing concern (to H) By hedging, S wants to show that he notices or attend to H’s face. Meanwhile, what he wants to communicate is that his attitude towards H is sincere and that what he wishes is always beneficial to H. Nói thật là mẹ tao đã nhờ người chạy việc cho mày rồi mà không được. Nói đơn giản là anh nhà ta đã mắc phải một căn bệnh mà hiện nay y học vẫn chưa có thuốc chữa nhưng chịu khó chữa trị là kéo dài được sự sống đấy. To be honest, I don’t seem interested in him any more. Frankly, the more I hear about your husband, the less I like him. Mr. Cameron, my husband hasn’t been well well. It’s ….. honesty, it is not something I can explain over the phone. Strategy 7: Mentioning/ Giving conditions This strategy focuses on the conditions suggested by S, implying that there should be some benefits for H if he takes it seriously. Sir, if you think my paper is interesting; I will make you another copy. Nếu dì mà cứ ca cẩm thế này thì cháu sợ là vợ chưa cưới của thằng Lâm nó chết khiếp. (If you keep complaining like this, I am afraid Lam’s fiancé will be scared of you.) Cháu nói thật nhé, nếu chú mà cứ nói nhiều thế này, cô ấy sẽ lại đi du lịch cho mà xem. (Frankly speaking, if you talked too much like this, she would go away for her holiday). Em gái ơi, thua keo này ta bày keo khác. Năm nay em chưa đỗ đại học nhưng nếu cố gắng có thể năm sau em đỗ mấy trường chứ lị. Strategy 8: Being vague Using this strategy, S wants to show the vagueness of time, money, etc. By this, S also wishes to convey that those indexes may not be accurate, and thus avoiding to blame H for his violation. Em không biết tại sao hai đứa mình không nói chuyện với nhau nữa và xem nhau như người xa lạ. Strategy 9: Passing the ball to the third party Passing the ball to the third party means that S avoids giving his opinion directly, so he employs this strategy, by resorting to the third party. To do so, S usually quotes or cites other sources, or goes indirect by assuming that what H has is a consequence done by the third party. Anh ạ, em nghe cái Lan nói cô ấy cứ nhăng nhăng nhít nhít, cô ấy thích nhiều người lắm, có lẽ không hợp với anh đâu. Tôi thiết nghĩ sự việc đơn giản lắm nhưng sếp nói nó phức tạp hơn nhiều. Strategy 10: Keeping silent Keeping silent, as a paralinguistic factor in communication, could be seen as hedging strategy. This is because S is afraid that what is said can hurt the addressee. That is why he chooses not to do any FTAs, thus not inferring H’s territory. However, Vietnamese hedges have their own distinct features. Interestingly, Vietnamese has a special kind of hedges called “từ láy” a phenomenon of word derivation, in which words are repeated to express different sense. Cái áo này trông nó xâu xấu thế nào ấy. (Cf Nguyen Quang, Tạp chí Ngôn ngữ 11 (158) 2002: Chiến lược lịch sự dương tính trong giao tiếp) Không khéo mứt Tết từ trước tới giờ mốc xanh cả rồi cũng nên. Cơ mà mình có bóc ra đâu mà ngại. Với lại, làm quà nom sao có vẻ nhiều nhiều đèm đẹp là được. (Bùi Văn Trọng Cường – Văn Nghệ Quân Đội 7/ 1999) Chị đừng xồn xồn thế, chuyện vợ chồng cãi cọ nhau phải bình tĩnh mới giải quyết được. Thằng con bác trưởng thôn chạy xe lập cà lập cập nên gây tai nạn trên phố rồi. Ma tà quỷ quái gì? Chỉ giở người. Con bé đang ở cái tuổi hâm hâm nên thế. Một vài năm nữa nó khắc sẽ khôn ra. (Nguyễn Thị Việt Nga, Ám Ảnh: 69) In daily conversation, “từ láy” are also considered an effective tool for hedging, particularly that is the repetition of “iếc”: ăn iếc, học hiếc, đi điếc …. (S does not highly appreciate what he is saying). Anh ta đi điếc thế nào mà đâm phải người đi bộ trên vỉa hè. Giờ học hiếc phải nghiêm túc vào con ạ, chứ cái Mơ nhà bác Hiền giỏi thế mà trượt đại học đấy. The study of hedges/ hedging by many authors is already the mirror for the researcher to make a comparison and analyze contrastively the data collected from survey questionnaire. CHAPTER 3: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 3.1. GENERAL VIEW 3.1. 1. Comments on the survey questionnaires The questionnaires used for this study are designed in Vietnamese and English with the same contents for Vietnamese and English native speakers respectively, aiming to collect authentic and reliable data. The questionnaire is comprised of two sections. To begin with, part 1 requests the respondents to fill in his/ her nationality, age, gender, marital status, living area (residence), occupation, and acquisition of language(s) other than his/her mother tongue. All of the obtained information about the respondent serves as a useful source for comments and later analyses. Apart from the MPQ questions to find out the functions of hedges in our social life in general and in giving bad news in particular, the other MPQ ones are based on Likert’s scale ranging from 1 to 5, i.e. from high advisability to strong inadvisability of giving bad news. There are four groups of situations under investigation. They are family life, social life, academic life, and business life. The situations are: Group 1: Family life S/he does not love him/ her any more Her/ his partner has another man/ woman Her/ his marriage is going to break up Group 2: Social life Her/ his relative just had a terrible accident S/he is suffering from fatal disease The cost for her/ his treatment is high Group 3: Academic life S/he failed the exam The book s/he needs cannot be found anywhere Her/ his assignment gets bad mark Group 4: Business life S/he is sacked Her/ his plan to improve the work is canceled S/he is forced to resign In this part, the informants were asked to put a tick in the column which they thought would appreciate to give bad news in a given situation. The initial purpose of the situations designed is to find out cross-cultural differences and to rate the assessment of possible choices by both Vietnamese and English native speakers in their real exchange, and hence to reach an initial understanding of the informants’ behavior, beliefs and norms when they encounter those situations. For the DCT questions, four situations from the MPQ section are chosen and modified with the hope of obtaining “really-be” utterances. The informants are requested to verbally give bad news to the following people: Best friend A person you dislike Colleague (same age, same sex) Colleague (same age, opposite sex) Acquaintance (about 10 years older than you) Acquaintance (about 5 years younger than you) Boss Employee 3.1. 2. Comments on the informants Firstly, the questionnaire aims at finding out the informants’ Age Gender Marital status Living area, and Acquisition of foreign languages All of the informants are Vietnamese and English native speakers. English speaking informants, who were asked to answer the questions, are from English-speaking countries such as the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. However, due to the author’s relationship, informants from Britain and the USA are more readily available. Table 1: Distribution on informants’ status parameters Informants’ status parameters VNSs ENSs No. of participants 50 50 Age > 20 18 20 > 30 18 20 > 40 14 10 Gender Male 21 23 Female 29 27 Marital status Single 20 32 Married 30 18 Living area urban 36 50 Rural 14 0 Occupation Student 20 0 Teacher 23 35 Accountant 07 0 Charity 0 15 3.2. FINGDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 3.2.1. Needs of hedging before giving bad news The aim of exposing some informative sentences containing some hedges is to find out the purposes of using hedges before giving bad news in everyday conversations. Your plan is rather good but I may think that it is not suitable for our work. “Well, could you please sit down and be calm? As you know, among 212 passengers, only two survived. And I regret to inform you that your husband is not among the lucky two”. Please tick (ν) where appropriate. More than one answer is possible. The italic phrases above are used in order to: Lessen the degree of directness Make it less unpleasant and shocking to the hearer Make the statement more polite Other (please specify) …………………………………………………………… Table 2: The main purposes of using hedges to inform bad news Purpose VNSs ENSs Lessen the degree of directness 48% 60% Make it less unpleasant and shocking to the hearer 90% 80% Make the statement more polite 20% 10% The table suggests that the reasons why VNSs and ENSs use hedges to inform bad news do not show many differences. 60% of ENSs confirmed that they used hedges to lessen the degree of directness whenever they wanted to inform bad news. Whereas, 48% VNSs agreed with the choice to lessen the degree of directness. Besides the purpose of lessening the degree of directness, hedges used to make the bad news less unpleasant and shocking to the hearer is chosen by 90% of VNSs and 80% of ENSs in addition to lessen the degree of directness. It is evident that they approve of the idea: hedging to make the bad news less unpleasant and shocking to the hearer because hedges have given the speakers a hand to let the other person know he/ she feels bad about it and hedging also makes the speaker more comfortable as the bearer of bad news. However, there is rather little difference in the aim: to make the statement mo