Đề tài A study on Evidential Modal Markers in English

PART I: INTRODUCTION * * * 1. MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY Natural languages, true enough, offer speakers many and various linguistic devices to facilitate their communication. That is, these devices are supposed to support the speakers in terms of sharing information together with expressing their emotions and attitudes. More importantly, these linguistic devices do give some certain influence over the listeners or the information recipients’ beliefs or behaviors. These devices fall into the category of Evidentials – one kind of Epistemic modality. (1) It sounds like it’s raining. (Evidentials) (2) The rumor is that she was killed. (Evidentials) Linguistically, Evidentials are of prime importance in both spoken and written language. Evidentials, admittedly, are said to come to the speakers’ assistance in expressing well their certainties, their doubts, their guesses, and their hypotheses in conversations and writings based upon the certain and absorbed ground of information. In other words, their utterance is normally said to consist of their attitudes towards the accepted fact in terms of believability, reliability, and compatibility. However, not many linguists have formed a distinctively profound study on Evidential modal markers. Most of the celebrated linguists have paid great attention to discussing Modality in general and Epistemic modality in particular. Palmer (Mood and Modality, 1986), for example, investigates and restricts his study of Epistemic modality to what is systematized and organized within the grammatical systems of languages. Whereas, Holmes (Mood and Modality,1986) presents the expression of Epistemic modality to which is attached the use of the full range of lexical devices in a variety of written and spoken texts. Lyons (Semantics, 1977) then offers theoretically possible examples of objective Epistemic modality together with subjective modality including modal adverbs such as “certainly” and “possibly” mentioned as lexical devices. Givún (Mind, Code and Context – Essays in Pragmatics, 1989) also shows his interest in modality in a way of producing a theory of Epistemic scale, meanwhile Halliday (An Introduction to Functional Grammar, 1985) applies his Theme-Rheme structure to the describing the syntactic functions of Epistemic markers in a clause as message. Also, among the Vietnamese linguists who prove absorbed in studying Epistemic modality, Do Huu Chau stands out as a linguist who discusses the concept of Epistemic modality in the view of pragmatics under his account (Systematic Semantics – Active Semantics, 1983). Besides, as far as learners of English are concerned, to master successfully Evidentials is not an easy task, even for those who are at more advanced proficiency levels. It is well observed that English learners just focus on the use of some certain Evidentials such as “think, sure, believe”, which sound popular and are ready on the tip of their tongue. To put another way, they lack varieties of Evidentials to encode the ground of information in their utterance. Consequently, that is thought to cause a barrier to the communication co-operation, even the doubt about the reliability of the utterance. Moreover, the poor use of Evidentials this way limits them to boring conversations. Given all the reasons, such a good and informatively full-of-knowledge study on Evidentials in English is necessary. Thus, the choice of “A study on Evidential Modal Markers in English” as the subject of the thesis is not accidental. 2. AIMS OF THE STUDY The study of Evidentials in English is centrally concerned with the following focuses: i. How evidentiality is expressed by Evidential modal adverbs and adjectives in English. ii. How evidentiality is expressed by Evidential modal nouns in English. iii. How evidentiality is expressed by Evidential modal lexical verbs in English. To achieve the aim, the study will examine three factors – semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic – that are said to have effects on the use of the expression forms of Evidentials. The study is expected to clarify the relationship between these expression forms and the difference in the way they express evidentiality. 3. SCOPE OF THE STUDY Due to the limitation of time, it seems too ambitious to cover all the means to encode evidentiality in English. Therefore, it is much better and more practical that the study just centers on pure Evidentials. Hence, a relatively small set of high-frequency Evidential lexical items which are restricted to our attention appear to stand out as follows: Evidential modal adverbs and adjectives: seemingly, apparently - apparent, evidently - evident, obviously - obviously, surely – sure, undoubtedly, doubtful. Evidential modal nouns: rumor, doubt, truth. Evidential modal lexical verbs: think, believe, guess, suppose, doubt, see, hear, taste, feel, smell, appear, seem, say, tell, sound, look. Despite the fact that the paralinguistic factors such as hesitations, facial expressions, body gestures, eye movements, etc. play an important role in expressing evidentiality, we find it impossible to figure them out in this thesis due to the limitation of time. That is the reason why we study Evidentials in only three aspects: semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic. In terms of semantic aspect, we will have a focused investigation into the lexical meaning of the Evidential modal markers. On these grounds, we will put them in order of certainty level, which proves useful for our study analysis. As far as syntactic aspect is concerned, we will have a close look at the way the utterances including Evidential modal markers are grammatically structured. Moreover, the position of these Evidential modal markers embedded within the utterance grasps our great attention. From the pragmatic aspect, we find it necessary to deal with the conditions that govern the use of these Evidential modal markers in the process of communication such as speech acts. Additionally, in order to have a more comprehensive account on the culture-specific aspect of Evidential modal markers, we will take account of theory of politeness. 4. METHODS OF THE STUDY Data collection procedure: With respect to the data presented in the thesis, they include primarily examples collected from authentic sources such as TV News Programmes at the website of BBC News ( (the programs broadcast on 4th - 30th April, 2008), and the newspaper International Herald Tribune, The Global Edition of The New York Times, Issues: September 5th - 14th, 2003. These written materials, and T.V News Programmes are all of common topics found in everyday life. All the data were noted down when we were watching the TV News Programmes and reading the issues of International Herald Tribune. The data are collected randomly from these two sources. Yet, the data presented in this study represent only a fraction of the data considered in developing the proposed analysis. With a view to serving the study well, utterances used as examples are in declarative form or the form for statements. A chosen utterance is required to: correspond to the expression of an Evidential modal function, and involve explicit one or more Evidential modal markers which have been mentioned as Evidential modal adverbs and adjectives, Evidential modal nouns, and Evidential modal lexical verbs. Data analysis procedure: The theoretical background is based on the theoretical frameworks by different linguists. Von Wright (1951), Steele (1975), Lyons (1977, 1995), Givón (1982, 1989), Palmer (1986, 2000), Keifer (1987), etc. propose such well known and convincing researches on which we will rely for the theory of Modality in general, and Epistemic modality in particular. Meanwhile, the linguists such as Belbert, (1977), Barnes (1984), Anderson (1986), Chafe (1986), Willett (1988), Bybee (1995), de Haan (1998, 2001), Nuyts (2000), De Lancey (2001), etc. stand out with multi-dimensional reseaches into Evidentials. That seems to open a world of references relevant in support of this thesis. The presentation of these linguists’ theory is to give the readers a big picture of Modality, Epistemic modality, and Evidentials. However, for the main aims of studying and analyzing the thesis semantically, we are going to take the frameworks by Givón (1982, 1989), and Palmer (1986, 2000) into consideration as principal ground of theory on which the Evidential modal markers are analyzed. The reason is that we look at Evidentials as devices of modality, which is well supported by Palmer’s theory. Besides, we tend to rank these Evidential modal markers at the scale of certainty level, which is well proposed by Givón. Furthermore, in terms of syntactic aspect, we are going to follow the theory by Quirk (1972), and Halliday (1985) which forms the basis for the analysis of Evidentials. The two linguists’ frameworks are at my disposal when investigating the position of the Evidential modal markers located within the utterance and examining the grammatical structures built for the expressions of evidentiality. As stated in the Scope of the study, we are going to consider Evidential modal markers in the context of the process of communication; hence, we will take account of the strategies the speaker uses when uttering with Evidential modal markers in light of Searle’s (1969, 1985), and Austin’s (1962) theory about Speech Acts and Brown’s and Levinson’s (1987) theory about politeness. That may well facilitate our discussion about the pragmatic aspects of Evidentials in the thesis. 5. DESIGN OF THE STUDY It sounds appropriate to divide the paper into three main parts: Part I: Introduction The Introduction presents the background of the study, states what the study is aimed at and what specific tasks it deals with, identifies the delimitation of the study, and gives a sketch of methods utilized together with the organization of the study. Part II: Development The Development includes 4 chapters: Chapter 1 is concerned with the theoretical concepts of Modality, Epistemic modality, and Evidentials. Chapter 2 discusses the semantic features of English Evidential modal markers with Vietnamese equivalents. Chapter 3 presents the syntactic features of English Evidential modal markers. Chapter 4 deals with the pragmatic features of English Evidential modal markers. Part 3: Conclusion The Conclusion offers an overview or a summary of the study in relation to modality, epistemic modality in general, and Evidential modal markers in particular. Some implications relevant are brought forward for learners of English and for further studies. PART II: DEVELOPMENT * * * CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 1.1. DEFINITION OF MODALITY A brief glance at two well-known languages, Latin and English is sufficient to suggest that the first assumption can be justified. Latin has its systems of mood: indicative, subjective and imperative; while English has a system of modal verbs: may, can, will, must, etc. The modal system of most familiar languages is formally associated, along with tense, aspect and voice, with the verbal systems of the language (and even gender, number and person are marked on the verb). Yet, modality, as will be seen, does not relate semantically to the verb alone or primarily, but to the whole sentence. Not surprisingly, therefore, there are languages in which modality is marked elsewhere rather than on the verb or within a verbal complex. It is common knowledge that the notion of modality is much vaguer and leaves open a number of possible definitions. Here is the presentation of some promising definitions by some celebrated and granted linguists. 1.1.1. DEFINITION OF MODALITY In Palmer’s theory (Mood and Modality, 1986), modality is defined as semantic information associated with the speaker’s attitude or opinion about what is said. Whereas, Bybee (Morphology: A study of the Relation between Meaning and Form, 1985) offers a broader definition that modality is what the speaker is doing with the whole proposition. Though these definitions diverge on the particulars, they agree that modality concerns entire statements, not just events or entities, and its domain is the whole expression at the truth-functional level. The notion content of modality highlights its association with entire statements; modality concerns the factual status of information: it signals the relation actuality, validity or believability of the content of an expression. Modality affects the overall assertability of an expression and thus takes the entire proposition within its scope. As such, modality evokes not only objective measures of factual status but also subjective attitudes and orientation toward the content of an expression by its utterers. Halliday (An Introduction to Functional Grammar, 1985) views that modality represents the speaker’s angle, either on the validity of the assertion, or on the rights and wrongs of the proposal. It is obviously seen that his definition of modality does not diverge much from Palmer’s and Bybee’s. For the good sake of a manageable study, it is recommended that Modality herein be understood in its narrow sense as a semantic term concerning the speaker’s attitude or opinion to the utterance. 1.1.2. PROPOSITION AND MODALITY Jespersen (The philosophy of grammar, 1924) talks about the “content of the sentence” and Lyons (Semantics, 1977) about “the proposition that the sentence expresses”, both wishing to distinguish them from the speaker’s attitude or opinion. This assumes that a distinction can be made in a sentence between the modal and the propositional elements, between modality and proposition. The distinction between proposition and modality is very close to that of locutionary act and illocutionary act as proposed by Austin (How to do things with words, 1962). In the locutionary act we are “saying something”, while in the illocutionary act we are “doing something” – answering a question, announcing a verdict, giving a warning or making a promise. These ideas are on the basis of speech act theory. Lewis (An analysis of knowledge and evaluation, 1946) proposes that “the proposition is assertable; the contents of the assertion…can be questioned, denied or merely supposed, and can be entertained in other moods as well.” But “modality” in this sense, referring to all the non-propositional elements of a sentence, is much wider than in the sense in which it will be used here. Similarly, Rescher (Topics in philosophical logic, 1968) talks about propositions and argues that where a proposition (which may be true or false) is subject to further qualification, this qualification represents modality. 1.1.3. TYPES OF MODALITY The distinction that Jespersen (The philosophy of grammar, 1924) draws between his two sets: “containing an element of will and not containing an element of will” is closely paralleled in Lyons’ reference to “the speaker’s opinion or attitude towards the proposition described”. Lyons, in conjunction with other scholars, recognizes two kinds of modality, using Wright’s terms: Epistemic modality, which is concerned with matters of knowledge, belief or opinion rather than fact. Deontic modality, which is concerned with the necessity or possibility of acts performed by morally responsible agents. Steele et al. (An encyclopedia of AUX: a study in cross-linguistic equivalence, 1981) implicitly make the same distinction: “Elements expressing modality will mark any of the following: possibility or the related notion of permission, probability or the related notion of obligation, certainty or the related notion of recruitment.” The remarks in Steele et al. can be illustrated from English; the following sentences can be interpreted either in terms of possibility, probability, and necessity, or in terms of permission, obligation and requirement: (3) He may come tomorrow. (Perhaps he will/ He is permitted.) (4) The book should be on the shelf. (It probably is/ Its proper place is.) (5) He must be in his office. (I am certain that he is/ He is obliged to be.) Lyons (1977) also suggests a distinction between objective modality and subjective modality. He presents a typical example: (6) Alfred may be unmarried. It can be interpreted that the speaker may be understood as subjectively qualifying his commitment to the possibility of Alfred’s being unmarried in his own certainty terms and the sentence is more or less equivalent to “perhaps Alfred is unmarried”. There are, however, situations in which the possibility of Alfred’s being unmarried is presentable as an objective fact. The speaker might reasonably say that he knows, and does not merely think or believe, that there is a possibility of Alfred’s being unmarried. In his words: “Objective modality refers to reality; it is part of the description of the world. Subjective modality, on the other hand, is the expression of the speaker’s beliefs.” These are two kinds of epistemic modality. The semantic differences between subjective and objective epistemic modality are significant. Objective modalized sentences are statements of fact; thus, they can be denied and questioned while subjective epistemic sentences, express the speaker’s beliefs and not statement of fact; hence, they cannot be denied or questioned. 1.2. EPISTEMIC MODALITY 1.2.1. DEFINITIONS OF EPISTEMIC MODALITY The term “epistemic” is suggested to be applied to not only modal systems that basically involve the notions of possibility and necessity, but to any modal system that indicates the degree of commitment by the speaker to what he says. In particular, it should include Evidentials such as “hearsay” or “report” (the Quotative) or the evidence of the senses. The Declarative, moreover, can be regarded as the unmarked (“unmodalized”) member of an epistemic system, though by this definition some languages have no “unmodalized” declaratives. This use of the term may be wider than usual, but it seems completely justified etymologically since it is derived from Greek word meaning “understanding” or “knowledge” (rather than “belief”), and so is to be interpreted as showing the status of the speaker’s understanding or knowledge; this clearly includes both his own judgments and the kind of warrant he has for what he says. It is often claimed in the linguistics literature that epistemic modality, unlike other kinds of modality, does not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance. Relatedly, several commentators argue that epistemic modality expresses a comment on the proposition expressed by the rest of the utterance: Epistemic modality… is the speaker’s assessment of probability and predictability. It is external to the content, being a part of the attitude taken up by the speaker: his attitude, in this case, towards his own speech role as ‘declarer’. (Halliday, 1970: 349) Epistemic modality indicates … the status of the proposition in terms of the speaker’s commitment to it. (Palmer, 1986: 54-5) Epistemics are clausal-scope indicators of a speaker’s commitment to the truth of a proposition. (Bybee & Fleischman, 1995: 6) Epistemic modals must be analyzed as evidential markers. As such they are part of the extra-propositional layer of clause structure and take scope over all propositional operators... (Drubig, 2001: 44) The intuition underlying this view is that epistemic modality in natural language marks the degree and/or source of the speaker’s commitment to the embedded proposition. According to this view, the proposition expressed by the utterance in (9) can be paraphrased by (10); the modal force of the utterance indicates that the speaker entertains the embedded proposition with a low degree of commitment: (7) John may be at home. (8) John is at home. This position on epistemic modality is at odds with several semantic treatments of modality, in which epistemic modality (alongside other types of modality) is seen as regularly contributing to truth conditions. On these accounts, modal operators in natural language encode modal force (necessity or possibility) which gets relativized with respect to different types of contextual assumptions or conversational backgrounds (Kratzer, 1981; 1991; cf. Lewis, 1986; Brennan, 1993; Papafragou, 2000). Depending on the specific conversational background selected, modal expressions receive different kinds of interpretation, as shown by the paraphrases in the examples below: (9) The children must be leaving. (10) a. In view of what the speaker knows, the children must be leaving. b. In view of what their obligations are, the children must be leaving. (11) John may leave. (12) a. In view of what the speaker knows, John may leave. b. In view of what the circumstances are, John may leave. The interpretations in (9a), (12a) involve epistemic conversational backgrounds, while those in (9b) or (12b) involve deontic (or root) conversational backgrounds. In this kind of theory, deontic and epistemic modality are treated symmetrically, and both are seen as contributing to the proposition expressed by the utterance. 1.2.2. TYPES OF EPISTEMIC MODALITY It is well known that Palmer claims epistemic modality is divided into two basic categories: Judgements and Evidentials. It is can be vividly described in the diagram below: Epistemic modality Evidentials Judgments Type a Type b Inference Confidence “certainty” - Knowledge Visual [Declarative] [Declarative] [Declarative] – Belief Non-visual Sensation Report Deductive Deductive Assumptive Assumptive “probably” Spectaculative “possibly” Diagram 1: Types of Epistemic modality (Palmer, 1986 : 95) Notes: [ ] unmarked member equivalence “stronger than” As shown in the diagram, Judgments and Evidentials are stated to be concerned with the indication by the speaker of his commitment to the truth of the proposition being expressed. Concretely, the former includes all epistemic notions that involve possibility and necessity, particularly with regard to speculation and deduction on the part of the speaker as subject or perceiver of the information. Judgments assert the possibility of the truth of a proposition without any overt indication of the grounds for the assertion. Judgments can be categorized by the degree of confidence that the speaker has in the assertion, which produce two subcategories: necessary judgments and possible judgments, respectively based upon inference and confidence, deduction and speculation, or strong and weak judgment. It is observed that Judgments in English, which have a variety of modal auxiliaries to indicate the speaker’s assessment of the content of the proposition. It is well described in these following examples: (13) Michael might lead the league in scoring next season. (14) There must have been many chairs in that room. In contrast to Judgments are Evidentials, which encode the grounds on which a speaker makes an overtly qualified assertion. Unlike Judgments, Evidentials explicitly signal the collateral that a speaker takes as substantiating an assertion. The concepts as well as the types of Evidentials will be discussed further and detailedly presented in the next part. 1.3. CONCEPTS OF EVIDENTIALS 1.3.1. DEFINITIONS OF EVIDENTIALS As mentioned above, Evidentials encode the grounds on which a speaker makes an overtly qualified assertion. To put it in another way, Evidentials encode the speakers’ source of information as well as indicate the reliability of the information. They put in perspective or evaluate the truth-value of a sentence both with respect to the source of the information contained in the sentence, and concerning the degree to which this truth can be verified or justified. Synonymously, Evidentials illustrate the type of justification for a claim that is available to the person making that claim. This justification can be expressed by markers referring to immediate evidence on the basis of visual observation, to inference on the basis of (non)observable facts, to deduction or inference, etc. In “Chafe & Nicholas” (1986), briefly, they represent a “natural epistemology”. More clearly stated, Evidentials also are to relativize or measure the information status of the sentence. The term “information status” is intended to include both the truth-value of a sentence and the relative importance accorded to it. Evidentials are said to own itself two essential properties. First and most importantly, a source of evaluation or reliability of the sentence is involved. This “source of information” defines who stands for the information status of the sentence. Secondly, the information status of the sentence is most often measured on the type varies: the sentence is measured with respect to reliability, probability, expectation or desirability. 1.3.2. DEFINITIONS OF EVIDENTIAL MODAL MARKERS Evidential modal markers are defined as lexical categories which indicate how and to what extent speakers stand for the truth of the statements they make. In English, all Evidential modal markers are lexical. English does not have grammaticalized Evidentials, but there are lexicalized Evidentials. The lexicalized Evidentials of English include the Evidential modal senses of verbs of expression and verbs of appearance, and Evidential adverbs such as “evidently and apparently”. Other language units for Evidential modal markers are about to be well-mentioned later. 1.3.3. TYPES OF EVIDENTIALS In the views of different linguists, Evidentials can be divided in different ways. Jakoson (1957) represents four types of Evidentials in terms of the source of information: quotative (hearsay), revelative (dream), a guess (presumptive), and previous experience (memory). For Carib, Hoff (1991) distinguishes introspective Evidentials (knowledge from inference) from extraspective Evidentials (culturally available knowledge). Taking Evidentials into consideration, Palmer (1986) observes that there are at least four ways of presenting a statement or a fact: speculative, deductive, hearsay, appearance based on sensory evidence. Barnes (1984) suggests that visual, nonvisual (sensory), apparent, secondhand, and assumed be types of Evidentials. Generally known, Evidentials can encode speaker-oriented qualifications of propositions along two dimensions: in terms of the evidence they are based on with respect to the speaker’s commitment to their truth The two dimensions – whether the proposition is based on perceptual evidence and whether the speaker believes in its truth – are logically independent. Yet natural language typically treats propositions based on perceptual evidence on the part of the speaker as propositions asserted by the speaker to be true. Similarly, if a speaker marks a proposition as based not on first-hand evidence, he/she typically expresses non-commitment to the truth of the proposition. That is why it is more useful to think of the terms Direct and Indirect – the two subcategories of Evidentials – as making a distinction based not on whether or not the evidence is perceptual, but on whether or not the evidence justifies the speaker’s belief in proposition. Evidentials Indirect Evidentials Direct Evidentials includes all the markers of the speaker’s firsthand evidence such as visual, auditory, and other sensory modalities, with visual evidence by far the most reliable. encompasses all forms of secondhand fact such as report, quotation, hearsay, assumption, appearance, and all other types of supportive, auxiliary information, of which quotation and hearsay are found the most common. Diagram 2: Types of Evidentials (15) I heard him beating the dog at 7 p.m. yesterday. (Direct Evidentials) (16) Rumor has it that the police have arrested John. (Indirect Evidentials) 1.3.4. SCALES OF EVIDENTIALS No doubt arises that scales, and more generally hierarchies, have proven useful tools in typology as well in semantics and pragmatics. In typological research, the most common type of hierarchy are implicational universals which are used to predict possible and impossible language systems as well as directions of diachronic language change, among other things (Croft ,1990, and Dik, 1981). In semantics and pragmatics, linguistics scales are taken to be an ordering of a set of linguistic expressions belonging to a single grammatical category, where the order is determined by degree of informativeness or semantics strength (Levinson, 2000). These scales are generally used to explain conversational implicatures (Grice, 1989) associated with the linguistic expressions they order. In terms of Evidential scales, Willet (1988) proposes the hierarchy as follows: ATTESTED > REPORTED > INFERRING In this hierarchy, he explains that “on the scale from most to least direct, Attested evidence is ranked as the most reliable source, Inferring evidence as the least reliable, and Reported evidence somewhere in the middle”. (Willett, 1988:86) Thus, for Willett the speaker’s preference of certain evidence types over others is based on two criteria: directness and reliability. He goes on to say that “a speaker using on Inferring evidential denies having reported or direct evidence,” that is, for him the indirect negation between Inference and Reportative goes in the opposite direction. Meanwhile, it is seen that de Hann (1998) shows another scale for Evidentials: VISUAL > NONVISUAL > INFERENTIAL > QUOTATIVE Here, de Hann orders Inferential above Quotative. He also uses two ordering criteria, the first of which is also directness. However, his second criterion is not reliability. With respect to the relative ordering of Inference and Quotative, de Hann (1998) states: “Within the area of indirect evidence, Inference is closer to direct evidence than Hearsay because by using a Quotative, the speaker relies wholly on evidence that comes from another source. The Inferential is used when the speaker is involved himself or herself with the evidence to a certain degree. The speaker makes deductions on the basis of evidence. This evidence has been collected by the speaker, which makes him or her more of and active partner than in the passive act of receiving information from another source.” Thus, de Hann’s second criterion is speaker involvement. Willett and de Hann, therefore, agree on the relative orderings derived from directness, namely that all kinds of direct evidence should be ordered above all kinds of indirect evidence, but their different second criteria lead them to postulate different relative orderings of Inference and Reportative. To contribute to building up the scales of Evidentials’ certainty, Givón argues that languages qualify evidence along four gradients. It is clearly shown in the diagram below: Evidence shown by Person Sense Directness Proximity Speaker Vision Senses Near Far Inference Hearing Other senses Feeling 3rd person Hearer Diagram 3: Gradients of quantified evidence (Givón, 1989) Moreover, Givón argues that there are three kinds of propositions (P), typed by their inherent certainty and need for substantiation: The High Certainty The Medium Certainty The Low Certainty P are taken for granted, presupposed and above challenge. Here, the presupposed information are assumed by the speaker to be known to, familiar to, or otherwise unlikely to be challenged by the hearer. P are doubtful hypotheses and beneath challenge and substantiation. P here are known as irrealis. The information whose source is largely irrelevant is weakly asserted. The speaker does not intend to defend the information in order to solicit challenge, correction or corroboration. P are open to challenge and thus require supporting evidence. P are known as realis-assertion. Under this mode, information is strongly asserted, yet it remains open to challenge by the hearer. The speaker must then be prepared to defend the information by citing the source of evidence. Diagram 4: Scale of Evidentials’ certainty (Givón, 1989) If a speaker is forced to choose evidence to defend his assertion, he chooses evidence according to the four scales presented in the diagram, and according to the internal order of the gradients, vision over hearing, for instance. Givón provides rules of evidence for his scale and points out that only in the case of realis-assertion is evidence assumed to be both available and expected, which is ranked according to the degree of evidentiary strength. It is also claimed that in languages further differentiating among several sensory sources of direct evidence, the grammar of evidentiality tends to rank the senses according to their reliability as source of evidence. Besides, in the grammar of evidentiality, one finds the ranking of either the participants in the event according to person or the temporal proximity of the reported event to the speech time in a rather predictable way. The diagram below does help to illustrate the scales: Scales Scale of temporal proximity Scale of spatial proximity Scale of participants in events Scale of reliability of sensory evidence Scale of evidentiary of source a. Direct sensory experience b. Inference from direct sensory evidence c. Indirect inference d. Hearsay a. Visual experience b. Auditory experience c. Other sensory experience a. Speaker b. Hearer c. Third party a. Near speech situation b. Away from speech situation a. Nearer to speech time b. Farther away from speech time Diagram 5: Types of scales (Givón, 1989) 1.3.5. EVIDENTIALS AND INTERACTION Various different types of interaction may arise between Evidentials and different values of person. In particular, interactions may affect the frequency or the interpretation of Evidentials, or both. These interactions can be considered to fall into four types: (1) The frequency of certain Evidentials varies greatly depending on person. For example, reported Evidentials are uncommon with first person because normally when a speaker was involved in an action, they do not need to be told that it occurred. (2) The interpretation of some Evidentials in some languages changes depending on the person values in the sentence. For example, with a first person subject, non-witnessed Evidentials often encode that an action was non-volitional, rather than indicating that the speaker did not witness the event, their more common interpretation. (3) Particular Evidentials and person values cannot co-occur in particular languages. For example, in some languages an inferred evidential cannot be used in first person contexts. (4) Certain Evidentials can be used with utterances which involve any person, but with restrictions on particular combinations of person and evidential with particular predicate types. For example, a predicate indicating something about an internal state may be used with a non-visual evidential, showing a speaker’s knowledge is based on feeling - but only if the internal state relates to the speaker, since otherwise the speaker cannot know about the state through having felt it. These four types of interaction are not fully independent — for example, it is precisely when a particular combination of person and evidential is infrequent that the evidential is likely to develop a distinct interpretation. However they are a useful schema for examining and classifying types of interaction. 1.4. THEME - RHEME STRUCTURE AND EVIDENTIALS Halliday (An Introduction to Functional Grammar, 1985) observes that in all languages, the clause has the character of a message: it has some form of organization giving it a status of a communicative event. In English, as in many other languages, the clause is organized as a message by having a special status assigned to one part of it. One element in the clause is enunciated as the Theme; this then combines with the remainder so that the two parts together constitute a message. In Halliday’s reference, the Theme is the element which serves as the point of departure of the message; it is that with which the clause is concerned. The remainder of the message, the part in which the Theme is developed, is called the Rheme. As a message structure, therefore, a clause consists of a Theme accompanied by a Rheme; and the structure is expressed by the order – whatever is chosen as the Theme is put first. As a general guide, the Theme can be identified as the element which comes in that first position in the clause to be the starting point for the message; it is what the clause is going to be about. Additionally, the Theme can be nominal group, an adverbial group, or a propositional phrase. Theme Rheme (17) The duke has given my aunt that teapot (18) Very carefully she put him back on his feet again (19) With sobs and tears he sorted out those of the largest size As for the Modal markers in general, and Evidential modal markers in particular, Halliday considers them the Modal adjuncts which are pointed out to be thematic, but not to be obligatory so. Besides, within the structure Evidential modal constructions can be found in many positions. Their mobility is well seen in the following examples: Initial Medial Final (20) I am sure (that) Peter (Theme) can pass the exam. (Rheme) (21) Peter, (Theme) I am sure, can pass the exam. (Rheme) (22) Peter (Theme) can pass the exam, (Rheme) I am sure. 1.5. BACKGROUND ON SPEECH ACT THEORY 1.5.1. SPEECH ACT THEORY This section offers a brief introduction to the basic speech act theoretic concepts developed by Searle and his colleagues (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985, Vanderveken, 1990, Vanderveken, 1991.) who based them on ideas first introduced by Austin (1962). Austin (1962) presents three acts the speaker performs when he/she utters a sentence: Locutionary act By locutionary act, the speaker selects language units as phonetic units, lexical items, grammatical rules and combines these to form an utterance. Illocutionary act By illocutionary act, the speaker is using a sentence to perform a function. He may use some specific language units as indicators to signal the function of the utterance. Perlocutionary act By perlocutionary act, the speaker conveys an idea, a further purpose which can be interpreted by the hearer, not on the surface of the words and structures of the sentence by means of his manner of locutionary act in an actual situation. Here come the basic assumptions of speech act theory which are summarized in the following quote from Searle and Vanderveken (1985). The minimal units of human communication are speech acts of a type called illocutionary acts (terminology introduced by Austin (1962)). Some examples for illocutionary acts are statements, questions, commands, promises, and apologies. Whenever as speaker utters a sentence in an appropriate context with certain intentions, he performs one or more illocutionary acts. In general an illocutionary act consists of an illocutionary force F and a propositional content P. For example, the two utterances “You will leave the room” and “Leave the room!” have the same propositional content, namely that you will leave the room; but characteristically the first of these has the illocutionary force of a prediction and the second has the illocutionary force of an order. (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985:1) An illocutionary force F is a complex entity. According to Vanderveken (1990:103), it has the following six components: an illocutionary point, a mode of achievement of an illocutionary point, propositional content, preparatory and sincerity conditions, and a degree of strength. The illocutionary point indicates how the propositional content of the illocutionary act relates to the world. For assertions, the illocutionary point is to match the propositional content to the world; for other speech acts such as directives, it is to match the world to the propositional content. Vanderveken (1990: 105) recognizes five illocutionary points, following Searle and Vanderveken (1985): the assertive point which consists of representing as actual a state of affairs; the commissive point which consists of committing the speaker to a future course of action; the directive point which consists of making an attempt to get the hearer to do something; the declarative point which consists of performing an action which brings into existence a state of affairs by representing oneself as performing that action; and the expressive point which consists of expressing propositional attitudes of the speaker about a state of affairs. Illocutionary forces have three types of pre-conditions as components: Propositional content conditions put restrictions on the propositional content of an illocutionary act of a particular force. For example, the propositional content of a promise must present a speaker’s future course of action. Preparatory conditions are certain propositions that speaker takes for granted in performing the illocutionary act. Sincerity conditions are “propositional attitudes of the form m(P), where m is a psychological mode such as, for instance, desire, regret, or hope […] A performance of an illocutionary act is sincere when the speaker has the mental state that he expresses in the performace of that act, and it is insincere otherwise” (Vanderveken, 1990:117). In respect of the degree of strength of an illocutionary force, it is considered a property of the mental states that are expressed in the sincerity conditions. As Vanderveken (1990:119) states, “the degree of strength of the sincerity conditions of supplication is greater than that of a request, because a speaker who supplicates expresses a stronger desire than a speaker who requests. Similarly, the degree of strength of a testimony is greater than that of a conjecture, because a speaker who testifies something expresses a stronger belief than a speaker who simply makes a conjecture”. 1.5.2. THEORY OF POLITENESS 1.5.2.1. POLITENESS IN CONVERSATIONAL MAXIM VIEW Leech (1983) sees cultural rules at work in expressions of politeness and attempts to categorize in more detail some of the underlying intent behind these forms by articulating a set of rules or Politeness Maxims at work in polite dialogue. Tact maxim: minimize cost and maximize benefit to other. Meta maxim: don’t impose on other so that he/she is made to break the first maxim. Generosity maxim: minimize benefit and maximize cost to self. Approbation maxim: minimize dispraise and maximize praise of other. Modesty maxim: minimize praise and maximize dispraise of self. Agreement maxim: minimize disagreement and maximize agreement between self and other. Sympathy maxim: minimize antipathy and maximize sympathy between self and other. 1.5.2.2. POLITENESS IN FACE-SAVING VIEW One of the leading theories of politeness was developed by Brown and Levinson (1987), who argue that there are two forms of politeness: positive politeness and negative politeness. Positive politeness strategies are attempts by a speaker to treat the listener as a friend or as someone to be included in discourse. For an American speaker, giving a friend or co-worker the compliment, “Your hair looks nice today,” would be one example of positive politeness. Negative politeness, on the other hand, is an attempt by the speaker to save the listener’s face by engaging in some formality or restraint. For an American speaker, an example of negative politeness would be responding to the question, “Do you like my new haircut?” with, “It looks great,” even though the speaker’s true opinion is that the haircut looks horrible. CHAPTER 2: SEMANTIC FEATURES OF EVIDENTIAL MODAL MARKERS IN ENGLISH The markers could be categorized and evaluated with the help of the scale of Evidential certainty which goes from the highest via the medium to the lowest degree of certainty. We adopt the scale of certainty proposed by Givón as presented in Diagram 4, part 1.3.4. The High Certainty The Medium Certainty The Low Certainty P are taken for granted, presupposed and above challenge. Here, the presupposed information are assumed by the speaker to be known to, familiar to, or otherwise unlikely to be challenged by the hearer. P are doubtful hypotheses and beneath challenge and substantiation. P here are known as irrealis. The information whose source is largely irrelevant is weakly asserted. The speaker does not intend to defend the information in order to solicit challenge, correction or corroboration P are open to challenge and thus require supporting evidence. P are known as realis-assertion. Under this mode, information is strongly asserted, yet it remains open to challenge by the hearer. The speaker must then be prepared to defend the information by citing the source of evidence. 2.1. EVIDENTIAL MODAL ADJECTIVES AND ADVERBS This section is wholly supposed to denote the semantic features of adjectives and adverbs (English – Vietnamese equivalents) which are considered Evidential modal markers. As Evidential modal markers, adjectives and adverbs, with respect to meaning, turn out to be more “direct” and “specific” than other lexical items expressing Evidential modality. Unlike Evidential modal verbs bearing a little bit more complicated and different semantic features, Evidential modal adjectives and adverbs directly and unambiguously indicate the Evidential modal meaning; therefore, they are seemingly the “purest” markers for Evidential modal qualification. The markers could be categorized and evaluated with the help of the scale of Evidential certainty which goes from the highest via the medium to the lowest degree of certainty. We adopt the scale of certainty proposed by Givón as presented in Diagram 4, part 1.3.4. So as to serve the study well, it is advisable that adjectives discussed be predicatively used adjectives followed by a complement clause; meanwhile, adverbs treated here must be sentential adverbs having a scope over the whole proposition expressed. For the reason, typical adjectives and adverbs are used for the analysis. They comprise such words as “seemingly, apparently - apparent, evidently - evident, obviously - obvious, surely – sure, undoubtedly, doubtful, clear-clearly; dường như là, rõ ràng là, hiển nhiên là, chắc chắn là, không còn nghi ngờ gì nữa là”. In this section, Evidential modal adjectives are going to be studied first, then Evidential modal adverbs. 2.1.1. EVIDENTIAL MODAL ADJECTIVES As the foregoing parts have mentioned, English has a number of adjectives regarded as markers expressing Evidential modality such as “apparent, evident, obvious, sure, clear, doubtful”. All these adjectives help the listeners or readers with the reliability of the information source. In other words, the statements uttered can be judged to be whether “true” or “false” (“reliable” or “unreliable”) in terms of the ground encoded by the markers. Thus, Evidential modal markers rank themselves at different levels of certainty. As far as the adjectives analyzed are concerned, each of them belongs to a certain group reflecting the degree of reliability. It is shown in the table below: The high certainty The low certainty clear, sure, apparent, obvious, evident; rõ ràng là, chắc chắn là, hiển nhiên là doubtful nghi ngờ rằng là Table 1: Scale of Evidential modal adjectives’ certainty 2.1.1.1. CLEAR, APPARENT OBVIOUS, EVIDENT “Clear” is defined as being impossible to doubt, question, or to be mistaken about or unmistakable (Longman, Dictionary of English language and culture, 1999). It can inferred that when “clear” is used the speaker intends to show that his/her assertion is well-founded on the basis of reliable source of information which is easily heard, seen, read, and understood. Similarly, “apparent”, “obvious”, and “evident” share something in common in terms of meaning that indicates the state of being easily seen or understood. It, thus, can be marked with the high level of certainty by the appearance of these adjectives within the utterance which is plain to the senses and clear because of maybe either visual or auditory evidence – the source of information. (23a) It is clear that we’ve been negatively affected by these changes. = Rõ ràng là chúng ta đã và đang phải chịu những tác động mang tính tiêu cực của những thay đổi này. (23b) It is clear to us that we’ve been negatively affected by these changes. = Chúng ta đều thấy rõ là chúng ta đã và đang phải chịu những tác động mang tính tiêu cực của những thay đổi này. (24a) It is evident they have no experience in this work. = Hiển nhiên là họ chẳng có chút kinh nghiệm nào trong công việc này cả. (24b) It is evident to me they have no experience in this work. = Tôi thấy rõ ràng là họ chẳng có chút kinh nghiệm nào trong công việc này cả. (25a) That he suddenly left home became apparent. = Việc anh ấy bỏ nhà ra đi đã quá rõ rồi. (25b) That he suddenly left home became apparent to me. = Tôi biết rõ cái việc anh ấy đã bỏ nhà ra đi. (26a) That he told a lie was obvious. = Cái chuyện ông ấy đã nói dối quả là quá rõ ràng rồi. (26b) That he told a lie was obvious to me. = Tôi biết rõ cái chuyện ông ấy đã nói dối. All the examples encode the same core Evidential modal meaning of the state of affairs (the high certainty) like “we’ve been negatively affected by these changes” in (23a-b), “they have no experience in this work” in (24a-b), “he suddenly left home” in (25a-b), and “he told a lie” in (26a-b) that “P is well-understood and clearly seen or heard”. Observably, these assertions in (23a, 24a, 25a, 26a) dressed up with only Evidential modal adjectives are regarded as impersonalized, which signals that the speaker may avoid specifying who is responsible for the judgments though in an explicit orientation; that is, they prove objectively oriented. Whereas utterances in (23b, 24b, 25b, 26b) are turned into being personalized in the presence of “to me” and “to us”, making them sound a little bit more subjective. 2.1.1.2. SURE Another adjective for Evidential modal qualification occurring so often in communication turns out to be “sure”. By Longman, Dictionary of English language and culture, 1999, “sure” is to express the speaker’s not doubting or seeming to doubt what he believes or knows, always attached to the person (pronoun) subjects. In fact, when the speaker makes “sure” of his/ her assertions, that means he feels confident in his/ her knowledge or the source of information for his utterance. Or that is to say, the utterance seems to be highly assured by the speaker in terms of certainty. (27) I am sure that I have met her before somewhere. = Tôi dám chắc rằng tôi đã từng gặp cô ấy ở đâu đó rồi. (28) I feel quite sure that Tom will pass the exam easily. = Tôi tin chắc rằng nó sẽ vượt qua kỳ thi một cách dễ dàng thôi. By means of two examples, “sure” can be said to be equivalent to “chắc là, tin chắc là, chắc chắn là, dám chắc là” in Vietnamese. As seen in (27-28), the speakers offer the high commitment to the propositions “I have met her before somewhere” or “Tom will pass the exam”. In order to make these statements, the speakers have to base upon what they have known or experienced. (27) indicates that the woman’s face appears familiar to the speaker, and from what he/she remembers he has drawn a conclusion that he/she has met her before somewhere. Similarly in (28), it is certain that the speaker knows well about Tom’s ability and Tom’s results at school; that is why he/she states with his strong belief that Tom are able to and will pass the exam easily. Therefore, the utterances’ proposition is strongly supported with a quite reliable source of information even though in such a subjective orientation. 2.1.1.3. DOUBTFUL On the contrary to “clear, evident, obvious, apparent” and “sure”, “doubtful” functions as a Evidential modal markers of the low certainty. “Doubtful” bears itself the feature of being uncertain and unconfident of the fact. Or the proposition is not well committed to. When the speaker utters the statement using “doubtful”, from what has been seen or heard in reality, it proves that the proposition lacks the evidence or the speaker neither has enough evidence nor feels sure of the source of information. Moreover, “doubtful” is said to be open to question. Equivalently, in Vietnamese “đáng ngờ là, đáng nghi ngờ là” can translate its meaning. (29) It is doubtful that John ever found out something about it. = Thật là đáng ngờ về chuyện /không thể có chuyện John đã tìm ra cái gì đó liên quan đến sự việc ấy. (30) I find it doubtful that John wrote this when he was ten. = Tôi không chắc/ tôi không tin/ tôi hoàn toàn nghi ngờ về chuyện là John viết cái này ở tuổi lên mười. The speakers in both (29-30) hold hardly any belief in propositions “John ever found out something about it” or “John wrote this when he was ten” which remain undependable. Or they cannot find out enough evidence to devote high commitment to such propositions. Thus, these propositions seem questionable, causing doubt to the hearer who is certain to know that the speaker cannot assure the source of information concerning John’s finding out something about it as in (29) and John’s writing it at the age of ten as in (30). The chosen adjectives here, though different in the certainty level, have well exemplified the Evidential modal markers. As suggested by Bellert (1977), these modal adjectives can qualify the state of affairs to the utterance and are part of the complex proposition expressed by the utterance. They can be both impersonalized and personalized, or can be subjectively as well as objectively oriented, which really depends on not only the speaker’s attitudes and intentions, or the evidence he/she acquires, but the structures the speaker utilizes for the utterance as well. 2.1.2. EVIDENTIAL MODAL ADVERBS Along with adjectives, a wide range of adverbs can be of Evidential modality. Some of them act as prominent markers which are taken into consideration in this section. They are composed of “clearly, obviously, evidently, surely, undoubtedly, apparently, seemingly”. Most of them are said to derive from the root of adjectives. They are tabulated in accordance with the certainty level in the table below: The high certainty The medium certainty clearly, obviously, evidently, surely, undoubtedly rõ ràng là, hiển nhiên là, chắc chắn là, không còn nghi ngờ gì nữa seemingly, apparently dường như là, hình như là Table 2: Scale of Evidential modal adverbs’ certainty 2.1.2.1. CLEARLY, OBVIOUSLY, EVIDENTLY These adverbs are all ly-adverbs whose roots are adjectives; thus, there is no denial that their meaning can be interpreted from the root-adjectives’. They imply that something is self-evident, i.e. it is no need of further argument. The speaker who is using “clearly, obviously, evidently” - the Vietnamese translations are “rõ ràng là, hiển nhiên là” - is expressing his/her very strong commitment in his/her proposition by either basing on visual, auditory evidence or logical inference. (31) He was obviously at a loss for my name. = Rõ ràng là anh ấy chịu không nhớ nổi tên tôi. = Anh ấy rõ ràng không thể nhớ nổi tên tôi. (32) Evidently, Kate is not well. = Rõ ràng là Kate không khoẻ. (33) You clearly don’t understand what I have explained. = Rõ ràng là bạn không hiểu những gì tôi vừa giải thích. = Bạn rõ ràng không hiểu những gì tôi vừa giải thích. (31-33) reveal that the speakers have felt confident in their information which comes directly from their own experiencing, or witnessing. Detailedly, in (31) the speaker might report his/her talk with a man who appeared to have forgotten the speaker’s name. (32) refers to the situation in which the speaker utters “Kate is not well” at the sight of her pale face, or on hearing her cough. (33) sees that the speaker might have a conversation with someone who fails to understand what the speaker has explained. 2.1.2.2. SURELY In Elizabethan English, “surely” meant what “certainly” does today, meaning “it is so” which implies no doubt. It is obvious that “surely” expresses a very high level of commitment in what the speaker is saying. “Surely” and its Vietnamese equivalents “hẳn là, chắc chắn là” show that the speaker is almost certain of what is stated. (34) Surely that is a plain-clothes policeman. = Chắc chắc đó là cảnh sát mặc thường phục. = Chắc chắn anh ta là cảnh sát mắc thường phục. (35) Surely I have met him before. = Chắc chắn tôi đã gặp anh ấy trước đó rồi. In (34), there is a hint that the speaker might have recognized a policeman who was dressed in plain clothes; accordingly, he says so confidently and definitely. The same thing can be applied to (35). Here the speaker has found some familiarity with the man’s face, which reminds the speaker of the fact that the speaker has met the man somewhere before. That means the speaker attaching some weight to the utterance. 2.1.2.3. UNDOUBTEDLY If “doubtful” can express the low certainty, then “undoubtedly” moves in opposite direction in terms of certainty scale. “Undoubtedly” is used for the affairs of the high certainty as to the source of information like “clearly, obviously, and evidently”. “Undoubtedly” is quite synonymous to “certainly” or “unquestionably” and equivalent to “không còn nghi ngờ gĩ nữa, đương nhiên là, rõ ràng là” in Vietnamese, (36) Undoubtedly, Pat is very intelligent. = Pat rất thông minh là chuyện quá rõ rồi. = Không có gì nghi ngờ về chuyện Pat rất thông minh cả. (37) John undoubtedly left home. = Hẳn là John đã bỏ nhà ra đi rồi. At the first sight of “undoubtedly” in English it is immediately inferred that this expresses negative polarity. But in fact, in terms of meaning, it does not; it reveals rather strong positive polarity though it is morphologically. It is much different from its Vietnamese interpretations “không còn nghi ngờ gĩ nữa”. In Vietnamese “không” plus other language items can cause the negative polarity to their meanings. Thus, (36-37) are assuredly positive as regards meaning. In (36), it is really true that Pat is very intelligent, which is well known to everybody. In other words, by what Pat has done does that prove his intelligence. Obviously, no question related to his intelligence is to be raised. Whereas, in (37) John might have been found nowhere; hence, basing on the fact, the speaker can make sure that John left home. 2.1.2.4. APPARENTLY, SEEMINGLY When being an adjective, “apparent” can be classified in the group of “clear, obvious, evident”, but in the form of an adverb “apparently” and “seemingly” are placed into the same classification. Both of them can be interpreted as “in appearance, according to the outward appearance or according to what has been heard” (Longman, Dictionary of English language and culture, 1999). In Vietnamese, they can be understood as “dường như là, hình như là” They signal the medium certainty in the proposition; to put it in another way, they express neither a very high nor a very low, but something between, commitment to what is stated. As for the utterance, it is required that evidence be added to support the source of information more. (38) Apparently she never got my letter after all. = Hình như là cô ấy rút cuộc chưa nhận được một lá thư nào của tôi cả. (39) That is seemingly an endless problem. = Dường như đó là một vấn đề vô tận. In (38-39), the speakers might judge from the facts as the speakers know them. In details, the speaker in (38) seem to have heard from some source, then produced the utterance of “her never getting the speaker’s letter”; meanwhile in (39) the outward appearance of the fact comes to the speaker’s assistance and drives him to provide such an assertion as “that is an endless problem”. Both the two propositions in (38-39) hold the medium certainty. As studied, “clearly, obviously, evidently, surely, undoubtedly, apparently, seemingly” are all modal adverbs as Evidential modal markers. They, according to Bellert (1977), qualify the truth of propositions expressed in the utterance in which they occur and hence constitute a second, meta-linguistic proposition. Differently from modal adjectives, they are not part of the propositional meaning but express the speaker attitude toward the proposition; as such, the speaker cannot question or negate his/her own current attitude. That is why the listeners or even readers on absorbing the statements including these Evidential modal adverbs uttered by the speaker can feel the sense of subjectivity. 2.2. EVIDENTIAL MODAL NOUNS It is common knowledge that nouns can function as subjects, complements, objects, and so forth. Besides these normal features, nouns like adjectives, adverbs or verbs can hold the function of expressing modality, “possibility”, or “probability” as examples. But, in our reference within the scope of our study, only nouns of Evidential modality are discussed herein. They are limited to such nouns as “truth, fact, rumor, doubt” which have the Vietnamese corresponding meanings of “sự thực là, tin đồn là, mối nghi ngờ là”, respectively. The scale of certainty by Givón will be made best use of to “weigh” the reliability of the assertions as well as the propositions in the speaker’s utterance. Thenceforward, implications of the certainty of the information sources can be exposed. Evidential modality can be well qualified with these nominal markers like “truth, fact, rumor, doubt” even though in different ways and at different levels of certainty. Before going into details, it is much better to demonstrate them in the table below in conformation to their rank of certainty. The high certainty The medium certainty The low certainty truth, fact thực tế là, sự thực là rumor, no doubt tin đồn là, không nghi ngờ gì doubt mối nghi ngờ là Table 3: Scale of Evidential modal nouns’ certainty 2.2.1. TRUTH, FACT As shown in Longman, Dictionary of English language and culture, 1999, “truth” is the state or quality of being true, or accepted for which proof exists. “Fact”, similarly, exposes “the reality”. The reason for gathering these two nouns in this sections for analysis is that they bear hardly difference in meaning, and they both carry the same weight in the speaker’s utterance. In other words, they make the listeners or readers show their confidence in what the speaker is saying. There seems no doubt in the propositions and no questions are needed for clearer evidence. Moreover, the source of information the speaker base upon when stating is somehow visible and well known. (40a) The fact is that Manchester United has defeated Chelsea in this season. (40b) It is the fact that Manchester United has defeated Chelsea in this season. = Sự thật là đội Manchester United đã đánh bại đội Chelsea trong mùa giải này. = Rõ ràng là đội Manchester United đã đánh bại đội Chelsea trong mùa giải này. (41a) That Mary was re-married to a Chinese billionaire is the truth. (41b) It is the truth that Mary was re-married to a Chinese. = Chuyện Mary tái hôn với một nhà tỷ phú người Hoa là có thật đấy. = Sự thật là Mary đã tái hôn với một nhà tỷ phú người Hoa. (42) The truth of the matter is that John doesn’t want to see you. = Sự thực của vấn đề là John không muốn gặp cô nữa. = Thực ra là John không muốn gặp cô nữa. In (40a-b), the speaker is thought to deduce the Chelsea’s defeat by Manchester United from reality or from what he has watched. (41a-b) implies that the speaker has derived the information “Mary was re-married to a Chinese” from what he might be told by others or from his own experience. (42) manifests that John might tell the speaker his intention of not wanting to see the girl or the speaker may know about John’s intention by judging from John’s behavior or attitude to the girl. 2.2.2. RUMOR “Rumor” is categorized into the group of hearsay markers. It unambiguously expresses Evidential modality. When it is in use, it means the speaker collect the information about something from others – from the informal source. Thus, the reliability of the utterance cannot be high. Or when it is uttered together with a proposition, the perceiver cannot judge whether the proposition is true or false. It requires, obviously, more evidence for more support. That is why “rumor” belongs to the group of the medium certainty. (43) Rumor has it that Jean is getting married again. = Mọi người đồn rằng Jean sắp tái hôn. (44) I hear a rumor that this company is importing plastics for toys. = Tôi nghe đồn là công ty này đang nhập khẩu nhựa để làm đồ chơi. (45) The rumor is that John committed a suicide. = Có tin đồn là ông John đã tự vẫn. Here in these examples, “rumor” implies that the information may be circled around and shared by many people including the speaker. This signals the Evidential modal stance between the truth and the message given by the speaker. It also keeps the speaker from committing himself/herself to the validity of the information such as “Jean is getting married again, this company is importing plastics for toys, and John committed a suicide” in (43-45). 2.2.2. DOUBT “Doubt” is the feeling of uncertainty of belief; it shows the lack of confidence or trust in what is being said. It may be said that the speaker has almost no evidence or enough information concerning the utterance. Consequently, “doubt” does not enable the proposition to gain the speaker’s strong commitment. However, when “doubt” is used in a different way, its meaning is immediately changed, and observably, so is its scale of certainty. If “doubt” is ranked, like the modal adjective “doubtful”, in the category of the low certainty, “no doubt” belongs to the group of the medium certainty. “No doubt” is studied to grasp the meaning of “almost certainly, or very probably” (Longman, Dictionary of English language and culture, 1999). It evidently shows much higher certainty and stronger commitment to the proposition than “doubt”. (46) It was the doubt that he was just trying to help. = Chuyện anh ta đã cố gắng giúp đỡ là vô cùng đáng ngờ. = Thật đáng ngờ là anh ấy đã cố gắng giúp đỡ. (47) No doubt he was just trying to help. = Không còn nghi ngờ gì về cái chuyện anh ấy đã cố gắng giúp đỡ cả. = Rõ ràng là anh ấy đã cố gắng giúp đỡ. (46-47) have reflected the difference in both meaning and level of certainty between “doubt” and “no doubt”, which has been referred to. Even though the proposition is the same, the truth-value of (47) is higher than that in (46). Or the speaker can identify the source of information more clearly in (47) than in (46). These nouns “truth, fact, rumor, and doubt”, as seen from the examples, can function well to convey the Evidential modality or they are thought of as “specific and clear” in the sense of Evidential modality. It is explained that if they are used, the grounds on which a speaker makes an overtly qualified assertion can be well encoded. The source of information or the reliability of the information, consequently, can be marked without any ambiguity. In all likelihood, the assertion can be realized at its certain level of certainty immediately the statement is uttered with these modal nouns. Undoubtedly, they are impersonalized inside themselves; however, when they occur together with other personal subjects, they are likely to be personalized. 2.3. EVIDENTIAL MODAL LEXICAL VERBS This section receives an emphasis on the role and properties of lexical verbs, called “Evidential modal lexical verbs”, as a means to convey Evidential modality. They are said to render the speaker’s evaluation of the factuality of the state of affairs expressed. Undeniably, they seem to be very “popular” and used so frequently with reference to the functions of showing the speaker’s opinion on and confidence in the truth-value or the source of the proposition. Thus, apart from Evidential modal adjectives, Evidential modal adverbs, Evidential nouns, Evidential modal lexical verbs are taken for granted that they are one of the primary means to impart Evidential modality. As known, these Evidential modal verbs are not easy to be well-understood because of their complexity. That is the reason for the ambiguity caused by these verbs. Moreover, these Evidential modal verbs have not yet been profoundly and concretely studied. This section, obviously, is necessary as a result. It is expected to offer an overview of verbs used for Evidential modal qualifications as well as the position of these Evidential modal verbs in the whole system of Evidential modal expressions. Within the scope of the paper, it seems impossible to cover all the verbs. There are limited and chosen verbs which sound typical in terms of the frequency of usage and the sense of Evidential modality. They include: Evidential propositional-lexical verbs: think, believe, guess, suppose, doubt; nghĩ là, tin là, đoán là, cho rằng, nghi ngờ là Sensory verbs: see, hear, taste, feel, smell, appear, seem, sound, look; thấy là, nghe thấy là, nếm thấy là, nghe mùi, cảm thấy, dường như Hearsay verbs: say, tell; nói rằng, kể rằng là 2.3.1. EVIDENTIAL PROPOSITIONAL-LEXICAL VERBS In general, it appears not to be an easy work to deal with Evidential modal lexical verbs, particularly here Evidential propositional-lexical verbs. For the linguists, if classifying or specifying the Evidential modal adjectives, Evidential modal adverbs prove easy, then how challenging it is for them to define which verbs can be Evidential modal verbs as well as Evidential propositional-lexical verbs and which cannot. It is advisable to choose “think, believe, guess, suppose, doubt; nghĩ là, tin là, đoán là, cho rằng, nghi ngờ là” for this section to focus on. They are thought to be the typical verbs which traditionally convey modality or Evidential modality with the first person pronouns “I, we”. The high certainty The medium certainty The low certainty think (must/certainly) thấy là think, believe, guess, suppose nghĩ là, tin là, đoán là, cho rằng doubt nghi ngờ là Table 4: Scale of Evidential propositional-lexical verbs’ certainty It is noted that “think, believe, guess, suppose, doubt” can perform the “process meaning” and “modal meaning”. As what is differentiated by both Nuyts (Epistemic Modal Qualifications on their Linguistic and Conceptual Structure, 1994) and Quirk (A Grammar of Contemporary English, 1972), these verbs used with “process meaning” show “activity”, while used with “modal meaning” they indicate “perception”. The former can go with progressive aspect, whereas the latter cannot. The latter will not be taken into account in the paper. During the process of analyzing each of the Evidential propositional-lexical verbs, the examples will be provided to illustrate the differences between these two meaning. 2.3.1.1. THINK In the sense of Evidential modal qualifications, “I think” is linked with the meaning of “I consider it probably true that…even though I am not certain of the information” (Nuyts, Epistemic Modal Qualifications on their Linguistic and Conceptual Structure, 1994). That means “think” - “nghĩ là” - in this case being ranked at the level of the medium certainty. However, when “think” is combined with Judgmental markers like “must” and “certainly” (“chắc là, thấy rõ là”) in the complement clauses, it can be placed in the high range of the certainty scale. (48a) I think he must be with his girlfriend now. (Modal meaning) (48b) I think he is certainly with his girlfriend now. (Modal meaning) = Tôi dám chắc là nó đang ở cùng với bạn gái nó đấy. (49) I think that Tom is right. (Modal meaning) = Tôi nghĩ rằng/ cho rằng Tom đúng. (50) Jude is back, I think. (Modal meaning) = Tôi cho rằng là Jude đã quay trở về. (51) The plane is taking off, I think, in 5 minutes. (Modal meaning) = Máy bay sẽ cất cánh, tôi nghĩ là trong 5 phút nữa. (52) I think of her all the time. (Process meaning) = Tôi luôn nghĩ về cô ấy. “Think” in (48-52) can be seen as the verb expressing the state of mind which is the result of reasoning process. Though similar in appearance, “think” in (52) cannot show the speaker’s view concerning the state of the affair; instead, it shows an “on-going” activity. The former clearly infers the assessment of the truth-value of the propositions by the speaker who has encoded, to some extent, the ground of the assertion. The latter only helps with the meaning that the speaker is missing his girlfriend much. The latter is said, thus, to carry the “process meaning” while the former is of “modal meaning”, i.e. the “Evidential modal meaning”. 2.3.1.2. BELIEVE Of the medium level of certainty, “I believe” - “Tôi tin là” - acting as a device of Evidential modality can be paraphrased by Nuyts (Epistemic Modal Qualifications on their Linguistic and Conceptual Structure, 1994) as “I consider it probably true that…though I am not completely sure”. In this sense, the speaker using “believe” expresses depth and assurance of feeling that is often based on inconclusive evidence. Compared with “believe” of “modal meaning”, “believe” of “process meaning” - “tin vào, tin tưởng vào” - only shows the speaker’s faith, trust, or confidence in the value of something. The examples presented below can bring out these two meanings of “believe”: (53) I believe they are getting married. (Modal meaning) = Tôi tin rằng họ sắp lấy nhau. (54) The Smiths, I believe, has just moved to Belfast. (Modal meaning) = Gia đình Smiths, tôi nghĩ rằng, họ vừa mới chuyển nhà đến Belfast. (55) Kate will be appointed that position, I believe. (Modal meaning) = Kate sẽ được bổ nhiệm vào vị trí đó, tôi tin là như vậy. (56) I believe in Jesus. (Process meaning) = Tôi tin vào chúa Jeus. (57) I don’t believe his account of the accident. (Process meaning) = Tôi không tin vào cái bản khai của anh ta về vụ tai nạn. (53-67) convey the modality in the ways of showing the speakers’ attitudes towards the utterance. As for Evidential modality, “believe” exemplified in (53-55) helps to put the sources of information into code; as such the speakers devote their between-high-and-low commitment to the propositions. That is to say, they have not collected or absorbed enough evidence to assert completely the information. Meanwhile, no same thing can be said to “believe” in (56-57). In fact, “believe” in these two examples can only reflect the meaning of process; it shows the speakers’ trust and faith in “Jesus” or “his account of the accident”. 2.3.1.3. GUESS, SUPPOSE When the speaker says “I guess” or “I suppose” – “Tôi cho rằng là”, he/she means that “I consider it probably or likely that… though I have no firm evidence for it” (Nuyts, Epistemic Modal Qualifications on their Linguistic and Conceptual Structure, 1994). Specifically, the speaker is known not to entirely commit himself/herself to the truth-content of the proposition. Thus, these two verbs are of the medium certainty level, just like “think and believe”. (58) I guess you don’t have time enough to go out now that you have young children. = Tôi nghĩ là bạn không có đủ thời gian để ra ngoài vì bận con nhỏ. (59) It’s going to rain, I guess. = Trời sắp mưa, tôi đoán vậy (60) Both John and Mary, I guess, felt unsatisfied with the results. = Cả John và Mary, tôi đoán là không hài lòng chút nào với kết quả đó. (61) She isn’t here, I suppose she has gone home. = Cô ấy không ở đây, theo tôi thì có thể cô ấy đã về rồi. (62) His book, I suppose, will be awarded the Nobel Prize. = Tôi cho rằng cuốn sách đó của anh ta sẽ có thể được trao giải Nobel. (63) I suppose that they left all for the party. = Tôi cho rằng họ đã đi ăn tiệc rồi. (64) Oliver will be sacked, I suppose. = Oliver chắc sẽ bị sa thải, tôi nghĩ vậy. These clear examples have led the readers to an immediate thought that the speakers in (58-64) are all not very certain of the utterance. They produce the propositions “you don’t have time enough to go out now that you have young children”, “It’s going to rain”, “Both John and Mary felt unsatisfied with the results”, “she has gone home”, “His book will be awarded the Nobel prize”, “they left all for the party”, “Oliver will be sacked” in lack of evidence and the source of information. 2.3.1.4. DOUBT Like Evidential modal adjective “doubtful” and Evidential modal noun “doubt” discussed in the foregoing parts, the Evidential propositional-lexical verb “doubt” is categorized in the low range of certainty scale. When “I doubt” – “Tôi nghi rằng là, Tôi không chắc là” is uttered together with some proposition, it is normally interpreted that “I consider it quite unlikely that… because I have no evidence for it”. (65) I doubt that she will get a job. (Modal meaning) = Tôi không dám chắc cô ấy sẽ tìm được việc. (66) We may have it ready by tomorrow, I doubt. (Modal meaning) = Chúng ta có thể chuẩn bị xong vào ngày mai, tôi không dám chắc đâu. (67) His conclusion, I doubt, is unreasonable. (Modal meaning) = Kết luận của anh ta, tôi nghi là không được hợp lý lắm. (68) I should not doubt him. (Process meaning) = Tôi không nên nghi ngờ anh ta. As can be shown in (65-68) all the propositions are doubtful hypotheses and beneath challenge and substantiation. These propositions here are regarded as irrealis. The information whose source is largely irrelevant is weakly asserted by the speaker. It is also clear that “doubt” in (65-68) differs from “doubt” in (68); the former’s meaning is evidentially modalized, while the latter means a process of activity. In line with the above semantic analysis, these Evidential propositional-lexical verbs are, in majority, used for expressions of the speaker’s prediction rather than deduction. In addition, they indicate some degree of uncertainty. “Think, believe, guess, suppose” are said to include the evidential component and require evidence. Thus, they belong to the medium range of certainty scale, except for the case of “think” going with other epistemic devices of strong judgments. Whereas, “doubt” contains almost no evidential component; it requires no evidence and is found in the low range of the scale. 2.3.2. SENSORY VERBS As Palmer (Mood and Modality, 1986) and Givón (Mind, Code and Context – Essays in Pragmatics, 1989) have stated, the strength of evidence depends on what type of evidence is. On the scale suggested by Givón (Mind, Code and Context – Essays in Pragmatics, 1989) evidence involving senses are considered as more direct and stronger than evidence upon which inference is based. Among the five senses, visual and auditory markers are most commonly used. Also, it is recommended to consider the degree of certainty given by Givón (Mind, Code and Context – Essays in Pragmatics, 1989) to these sensory verbs: VISION > HEARING > OTHER SENSES > FEELING (> means “stronger”) 2.3.2.1. SEE, HEAR In the English system, there are lexical verbs performing the function of marking visual experience. Such a typical verb as “see” - “thấy rằng, tận mắt thấy là” is used to report visual experience as the firsthand one that the speaker has when making a realis-assertion which is open to challenge for evidence. In other cases, the evidence of an assertion can be auditory. That is, the speaker encodes his commitment to the content of his utterance by asserting that he directly hears something. Therefore, he can present the event with his direct auditory perception. English has “hear”, and correspondingly, Vietnamese has “chính tai …nghe thấy là, nghe thấy là”. (69a) I saw him walk across the street. (69b) I saw him walking across the street. = Tôi trông thấy anh ấy đi qua đường. = Tôi trông thấy anh ấy đang đi qua đường. (70a) I hear John scold hid son. (70b) I hear John scolding his son. = Tôi nghe thấy John mắng con trai ông ấy. = Tôi nghe thấy John đang mắng con trai ông ấy. In (69b) the speaker asserts that at that moment of the event the man was on the way and the event was incomplete, while in (69a) the speaker implies that he/she witnessed the man walked from one side to the other and the event was complete. Similarly, 70b) signal that the grounds for the assertions lie in the speaker’s direct auditory encounter with the event. However, a slight difference is realized that (70b) conveys the incomplete action of John’s scolding, whereas (70a) shows that the speaker hears from the beginning to the end of the event that “John scolded his son”. 2.3.2.2. SEEM, APPEAR Both of these verbs “seem and appear” can be interpreted as “dường như là, có vẻ như là” in Vietnamese. Normally, they talk about one’s appearance which can be perceived by his/her expressions or behaviors. Noticeably, when these two verbs are used as copulas, they are regarded as describing cases of direct impression (subjective and evaluative); however, if used in the structures where they are followed by phrases introduces by “TO BE”, they are considered to describe indirect perception accompanied by some Evidential modal qualification (Usoniene, Perception verbs revisited, Working paper, Dept. of Linguistics, Lund University, 1999). (71) She seems/ appears tired. = Trông cô ấy có vẻ mệt mỏi. (72) He seems/ appears to be sincere. = Anh ta tỏ vẻ ra là chân thành. (71-72) signal tentative assertions. As presented in (71), the assertion by the speaker mean that the woman’s facial expression shows her physical state, while by the observation of the man’s behaviors can the speaker provide the assertion of his sincerity in (72). With the presence of “TO BE”, (70) sounds more direct than (71). 2.3.2.3. LOOK, FEEL, SOUND, TASTE, SMELL These verbs “look, feel, sound, taste, smell” - “trông có vẻ là, cảm thấy là, nghe có vẻ là, có vị là, nghe mùi như là, ngửi mùi như là” - in the Giaborne’s view (English perception verbs, UCL PhD dissertation, 1996) are identified as the SOUND-class verbs. These verbs all are said to hold the sensory modality, namely Evidential modality. All these verbs are used to show the direct evidence on the basis of direct experience. In this sense, all these verbs are Evidential modal ones used where the referent of the subject has properties that provide the evidence for the evaluation. (73) This piece of music sounds lovely. = Đoạn nhạc này nghe thật hay. (74) He looks very ill. = Trông anh ta rất ốm. (75) The fabric feels thin. = Miếng vải này sờ rất mỏng. (76) The wine smells delicious. = Rượu này vị ngon thật. (77) This food tastes rancid. = Món thức ăn này có mùi thiu mất rồi. It is clear that, in (73), the referent “this piece of music” is the sound-er and its melody is the evidence for its being lovely. In (74), the referent “he” is the look-er and his appearance is the evidence for his being “very ill”. Meanwhile, the speaker can judge by the fabric’s feel, the wine’s smell, the food’s taste, he/she assert their states of being thin, delicious, randid respectively. Also obviously, it is the sound, look, feel, smell, and taste of the subjects that provides the evidence for the speaker’s assertion. When prepositions “like” or subordinators “as if, as though” are attached to these verbs, semantically, their meaning proves a bit different. (78) It sounds like Jane. = Nghe như giọng của Jane ấy. (79) It feels like sandpaper. = Cái này sờ như giấy nhám ấy. (80) It smells/ tastes like chocolate. = Nó có mùi/ vị như mùi/ vị sôcôla ấy. (81) It looks like going to rain. = Nhìn trời có vẻ như sắp mưa ấy. (82) He sounded as though he knew well about that. = Nghe anh ta nói cứ như là anh ta biết rõ về chuyện ấy lắm. (78-82) can be seen as examples for the the speaker’s evaluation of the fact. For instance, (78) could mean “it is making a noise like Jane makes”, where the referent of “it” is the “er” of the sense of “sounds” and it is the sense of “sounds” that is like Jane; or “it appears from everything that I have heard that it must be Jane”; that is, it has an evaluative meaning. Briefly, with the preposition “like” or subordinators “as though or as if”, the comparison is made by the speaker after such a clear experience. These sensory verbs all provide the speaker with confidence in their source of information or evidence on which directness rather than indirectness is shown in their assertion. Most of the cases in the analysis are used to convey the firsthand evidence, which supports the speaker’s commitment at its maximum of certainty. 2.3.3. REPORT VERBS AND HEARSAY VERBS As mentioned, the evidence of an assertion can be signaled by some markers which overtly qualify this assertion. Palmer (Mood and Modality, 1986) points out that markers of this type are indirect evidence, i.e. evidence via verbal report. Willet (A Cross-Linguistic Survey of Grammaticalization of Evidentiality Studies in Language, 1988) proposes that reported evidence may be specially marked as secondhand or third-hand one. In line with Willet’s view, that is to say, basing on the way the speaker gets information, the declarative structures can be divided into two types: report and hearsay. In the report type, the information is provided by a specific person. This type of information is more reliable than the hearsay type, where the speaker cannot say who has informed him/her. Considering the scale of reliability by Givón (Mind, Code and Context – Essays in Pragmatics, 1989), it is said that the information sated by the speaker himself/herself is more reliable than by the direct listener; the information by the indirect listener is the least reliable. SPEAKER > DIRECT LISTENER > INDIRECT LISTENER (> means “more reliable”) The report type is corresponding to the case where the speaker is in the role of a direct listener, and the hearsay type to the case where the speaker is in the role of an indirect listener. 2.3.3.1. SAY, TELL In English system, the report markers can formed with the verbs of speaking types such as “say, tell” - “nói rằng, kể rằng”. These two verbs are found to be so-called “pure” report verbs when going with the subject “he, she, a noun, or a proper name”. Yet, when combining with “they, people, some” as subjects or appearing in the form of passive voice with the non-personal subject “It”, these two verbs are turned into being hearsay verbs. For the former, the person who fed information to the speaker is identified, and thus, named in the speaker’s report. By this way does the speaker seem to commit himself/herself a little more to the content of the assertion. For the latter, the speaker does not want to present information as firsthand information but as non-firsthand. Therefore, it can be inferred that the information introduced by hearsay verbs may be circled around before it is received by the speaker as third-hand knowledge. (83) Tom says he cannot live on his income. (Report) = Tom nói rằng anh ấy không thể sống dựa vào thu nhập của mình. (84) His mother told me that he was hit by a van. (Report) = Mẹ anh ấy bảo là anh ấy bị xe tải đâm. (85) They say that this company has sacked many employees. (Hearsay) = Thấy người ta nói là công ty đó vừa sa thải nhiều công nhân lắm. (86) It’s said that she was vigorously beaten by her husband. (Hearsay) = Nghe đồn là cô ấy bị chồng đánh đập tợn lắm. (87) Someone says he’s been arrested. (Hearsay) = Ai đó nói là hắn vừa bị bắt rồi. 2.3.3.2. HEAR Another verb which should be discussed here is “hear”. “Hear” is usually seen as a verb of sense, which means “to perceive sound by ear” (“nghe thấy”); however, when it occurs with That-clause, it means “to receive information by report or by letter” or “to be told by others” (thấy là, nghe thấy là). With this meaning, “hear” belongs to the report type. More interestingly, “hear” can be listed in the group of hearsay verbs if the modal noun “rumor” follows it (“nghe đồn là”). Explicably, in this case, the speaker sounds as the indirect receiver of the information which is circled around or shared. (88) I heard that she got married. (Report) = Tôi được biết là cô ấy đã cưới rồi. (89) I heard the rumor that he went to Milan for the show. (Hearsay) = Tôi nghe thấy người ta đồn rằng anh ta đã đi Milan cho buổi trình diễn rồi. 2.4. SUMMARY This chapter has produced the analysis of the Evidential modal markers including Evidential modal adjectives, Evidential modal adverbs, Evidential modal nouns, and Evidential modal lexical verbs. All these Evidential modal items are correspondingly translated in Vietnamese for better understanding. Semantically, Evidential modal markers in English can be categorized in the deictic structure as inferring, sensation, and external information from the source and direction of evidence. Evidential modal markers in each category, in turn, can be sub-scaled with the three degrees of certainty: the highest certainty, the medium certainty, and the lowest certainty. CHAPTER 3: SYNTACTIC FEATURES OF EVIDENTIAL MODAL MARKERS IN ENGLISH 3.1. EVIDENTIAL MODAL ADJECTIVES AND ADVERBS 3.1.1. EVIDENTIAL MODAL ADJECTIVES Evidential modal adjectives in English are found in predicative position and they are characteristically used with a non-personal subject (“It” appears in the speaker’s preference in most of the cases), or sometimes with personal subjects such as the first person pronoun subject “I”. (90) It is apparent that Mary got divorced. = Rõ ràng là Mary đã ly dị. = Mary rõ ràng là đã ly dị. (91) I am sure that he has won the lottery. = Tôi dám chắc là anh ấy đã trúng sổ xố. And within the Theme-Rheme structure, these Evidential modal adjective constructions can be placed in many positions: initial, medial, and even final in English. (92) That he ever passed the exam is doubtful. = Cái chuyện anh ấy đã đỗ qua kỳ thi quả thật là đáng ngờ. = Thật là đáng ngờ về cái chuyện anh ấy đã đỗ qua kỳ thi IELTS. (93) The Smiths, I am sure, went to Amsterdam for holidays. = Tôi dám chắc là nhà Smiths đã đi nghỉ ở Amsterdam rồi. 3.1.2. EVIDENTIAL MODAL ADVERBS From Quirk’s view (Quirk et al., 1972), the modal adverbs belong to a general class of “attitudinal adjuncts”. They are “peripheral in clause structure”, i.e., they are specifically sentential adverbs. Their peripherality can be seen in the fact that they can appear in a number of different positions - initial, medial, or final - within the clause without affecting the relation between the clause and the adverb though the overall meaning of the resulting sentence may differ. “Clearly, obviously, evidently, surely, undoubtedly, apparently, seemingly” and “rõ ràng là, hiển nhiên là, chắc chắn là, không còn nghi ngờ gì nữa là, dường như là” also lie in this school of thought. (94) Obviously, he is at home. = Rõ ràng là anh ta đang ở nhà. (95) He received Mary’s letter, undoubtedly. = Anh ta đã nhận được thư của Mary gửi rồi, chắc chắn mà. (96) John apparently went out with his daughter. = Hình như John đã đi ra ngoài cùng con gái rồi thì phải. Another syntactic feature is put forward by Jackendoff (1972) that modal adverbs do not occur in questions. Bellert (1977), Quirk et al. (1972) and Perkins (1983) share the same viewpoint. They also claim that these adverbs cannot become the question focus. However, some other modal such as “surely” can possibly appear in questions though the state of affairs is questioned, not “surely”. It is exemplified hereunder: (97) Surely he has got many friends here? = Có chắc là anh ấy có nhiều bạn ở vùng này không? 3.2. EVIDENTIAL MODAL NOUNS “Truth, fact, rumor, and doubt” are all the factive abstract nouns. When they play a role in expressing modality in general, Evidential modality in particular, they normally appear in the Noun phrase. As far as Quirk’s view is concerned (A University Grammar of English, 2003), these nouns can be found in the restrictive appositive clauses. As with apposition, the apposed units can be linked with “be” (where the copula typically has nuclear prominence): (98) The fact is that no one is infallible. = Thực tế là không có ai sai cả. Besides, these Evidential modal nouns are almost used in the nominal clauses, especially That-clauses which can function as subject: (99) That she is still alive is the truth. = Chuyện cô ấy vẫn còn sống là sự thật đấy. or as direct object: (100) I find no doubt that he was wrong. = Tôi chẳng thấy nghi ngờ gì về cái chuyện anh ấy làm sai cả. or as subject complement: (110) The rumor is that he has shot his wife to death. = Thấy đồn là lão ấy đã bắn chết vợ mình. The impersonal subject “It” can be utilize to introduce the noun in the clause structured like [It be Evidential Modal Noun that P]: (111) It is the truth that he was in prison for 20 years. = Sự thực là ụng ấy đó từng bị giam trong tự 20 năm. Evidential modal noun constructions can be seen in either the initial or final position. There seems to be hardly any case that Evidential modal noun constructions are placed in the medial position except for “no doubt”. (112) He no doubt arrived late for the interview. = Anh ta rành rành ra là đã đến phỏng vấn muộn. 3.3. EVIDENTIAL MODAL LEXICAL VERBS 3.3.1. EVIDENTIAL PROPOSITIONAL-LEXICAL VERBS Like other modal verbs, Evidential propositional-lexical verbs treasure two main properties which are found by both Quirk (A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language, 1972) and Huddleston (Introduction to the Grammar of English, 1984). The first one is inflection. That means they tensed, “past tense or present tense”. The second one is functional potential. In other words, they can function as the main verb in the verb-phrase of the clause. Additionally, these verbs are mostly accompanied with first person subject. Hence, they performatively are used to indicate, not to report, the opinions and attitudes of the speakers. By this way are all the propositions in the utterances signified with the truth-value. (113) I think it is a good place to enjoy the holiday. = Tôi cho rằng đó là một nơi thú vị cho kỳ nghỉ đấy. (114) I thought that she was fired. = Tôi tưởng cô ấy đã bị đuổi việc. As far as the syntactic patterns are concerned, these verbs are complemented by That-clause or by an elliptical variant of it. (115) I think that he will tell you a lie. = Tôi nghĩ rằng anh ấy sẽ nói dối bạn đấy. (116) I think so. = Tôi cũng nghĩ vậy. Interestingly, these verbs can be used parenthetically as comment clauses which function as attitudinal disjuncts. Given the fact, they can mark straightforwardly the speaker Evidential modal qualification over the state of affairs. Visibly, these verbs can take initial, medial, or even final positions within the utterance. (117a) He may be here, I suppose, in a nick of time. (117b) He may be here in the nick of time, I suppose. = (Tôi cho là) anh ấy sẽ có mặt ở đây đúng lúc thôi mà (Tôi cho là như vậy) 3.3.2. SENSORY VERBS Apparently, among these sensory verbs, some share the same syntactic features; some differ from one another. Acceptably, “see” and “hear” the structure in common, while “seem, appear, look, sound, feel, smell, taste” can be relatively similarly structured. The former can be found with the Bare infinitive clauses or the Ing-participle clauses. Within the Theme-Rheme structure, these two verbs are normal to the initial position where evidence can be asserted at first place. (118a) I saw her husband do the gardening. (118b) I saw her husband doing the gardening. = Tôi thấy chồng bà ta làm vườn/ đang làm vườn. (119a) I heard someone pass in the street. (119b) I heard someone passing in the street. = Tôi nghe thấy có tiếng ai đó đi/ đang đi qua phố ấy. The latter can function as copulas “Be”. Adjectives are said to follow to complement these kinds of verbs. Besides, the preposition “like” or subordinators “as if, as though” can be added to create such adverbial clauses of comparison; and in case “doubt” or “unreality” is raised, the modal past is required. They can be placed in the medial position in Rheme. (120) She seems like a shy girl. = Cô ấy trông có vẻ là rất e dè. (121) It smells like ash. = Nghe như có mùi tàn thuốc thì phải/ Nó có mùi giống mùi tàn thuốc. (122) He sounded as if he had never met me before. = Anh ta nói cứ như là chưa bao giờ gặp tôi ấy. (123) He looks so exicted. = Trông anh ta thật hứng khởi. (124) He looks as though he is going to be ill. = Trông anh ta như sắp ốm đến nơi rồi ấy. 3.3.3. REPORT VERBS AND HEARSAY VERBS “Say, tell, hear”, either report verbs or hearsay verbs, all are tensed. They can occur with the “past tense” or “present tense”. Besides, they are followed by That-clause. In this kind of Evidential modal expressions, the passive voice can be used with the non-personal subject “It” to indicate the source of the information as well as the speaker’s intention of making his/her statements sound more objective. By means of “It”, the speaker is found to lower his/her responsibility or commitment in the truth of the proposition stated. With regard to the positions in Theme-Rheme structure, these hearsay or report verbs can be mostly placed in the initial and final positions. (125) He said that he had left his job. = Anh ta nói rằng anh ta đã bỏ việc. (126) Tom tells everybody that he is going to get married. = Tom nói với mọi người là anh ấy sắp lập gia đình. (127) It is said that he is a first-rate sportsman. = Mọi người nói rằng anh ấy là nhà thể thao hạng nhất. (128) A growing baby needs much green, the nutritionist says. = Một đứa trẻ đang phát riển cần ăn nhiều rau, các nhà dinh dưỡng nói vậy. 3.4. SUMMARY This chapter has presented the analysis of the Evidential modal markers including Evidential modal adjectives, Evidential modal adverbs, Evidential modal nouns, and Evidential modal lexical verbs in terms of syntactic aspect. It is observable that, grammatically, in English tense as the deictic notion takes up the burden of Evidential modality to encode the Evidential stance as remoteness from the reference world. In fact, tensed markers in English signal less commitment to the proposition. Furthermore, Evidential modal markers in English show their mobility in the clausal structure in that they can occur at any position open to adverbials. CHAPTER 4: PRAGMATIC FEATURES OF EVIDENTIAL MODAL MARKERS IN ENGLISH In Givún’s view (1989), human communication involves a complicated network of conventions with reference to what the speaker and hearer are entitled to expect of each other when they play their respective roles in communication. In that light, Evidentials seem under control of the contract between the speaker and hearer. It is understandable that under the contract the speaker take responsibility for the evidentiary justification of the information in terms of its source and reliability. Meanwhile, psychologically, the contract governs the subjective certainty the speaker assign to the information shared. Apart from that, the contract also influences, intentionally, interpersonally, and socially, the interaction between the speaker and hearer. That is, the hearer may set off his/ her reactions ranging from challenge to tacit assent to affirmation. It is well-observed from Givún’s opinion (1989) that among various propositional modalities exist some inferential connections. They are described as follows: Truth ẫ Knowledge Knowledge ẫ Certainty Certainty ẫ Status Status ẫ Power As can be seen, these inferences are pragmatic norms in association with the communicative contract embedded within the context of the interaction. When facing an interlocutor